No, it really isn't easier than that. If an attacker is in control of the device that controls the screen, they can make it show you anything that they want, including showing the right text for the transaction you're actually making. Then, when you enter the PIN, they can perform your transaction, and repeat the process for a second one using the PIN data that they already captured. If a device vendor manages to somehow make it physically impossible to perform two transactions without entering the PIN twice, they could display something that looks like a legitimate error message (e.g. a communication error), causing the user to enter the PIN twice. Either way, you've gained nothing.
For that matter, they could show you your actual purchase, but really perform a transaction for airline tickets to Barbados, then not perform your actual purchase, but tell the register that they did. Then, to make the balance sheets look right from the store's perspective, they could add ten cents to the next few dozen transactions to cover the cost of your actual purchase. The error would only be caught on the store side through a thorough audit, and because the stolen card would not have a transaction for the store, there would be nothing suspicious about the transactions to draw the CC companies' attention towards that store, because after all, no consumer is likely to notice a missing transaction.
Securing the transaction between the consumer and the bank is hard, because the merchant's systems are inherently untrusted. The second that display screen ceases to be absolutely trusted, you've lost the security battle.