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Comment Re:bayonet mount- on a computer (Score 4, Interesting) 160

This is an interesting variation of the camera lens bayonet mount that includes a "breakaway mode" if it is dropped that allows the lens to snap out without damaging the device or the mount. With a normal DSLR lens mount, that doesn't happen and the lens will remain firmly attached until one of the mounts breaks, whereas this one will release instead of breaking.

Comment Re:Never gonna happen (Score 1) 704

Various social engineers have been trying for decades to change human nature. It hasn't worked in the past and it won't work in the future any better than attempting to change cats into vegans would. Even if they manage to suppress the expression of the thoughts in one place, it just pops up elsewhere, or worse, festers into a sudden explosion of rage.

Comment Re:Recycle! (Score 3, Insightful) 323

Consider the source - FTS: "Scott Corley, the Executive Director of immigration-reform group Compete America"

This isn't coming from a CEO, it's coming from a political activist. And of course, he is dead wrong about "The further you get away from your education the less knowledge you have of the new technologies...". Someone just out of school hasn't actually worked with the new technologies as they have trickled into existence as someone who has been in the field for years has.

Comment Visibility (Score 2) 94

There is really no way for any code running on top of another layer to verify that lower layer's integrity - it has to rely on what is reported and a malicious BIOS or UEFI layer can simply just lie to it. Hell, it's possible for a low-level hypervisor to run another, clean, BIOS/UEFI and simply virtualize every piece of hardware in the box. Likewise, it can block visibility of any traffic going in and out that it desires. This type of security has to happen at the network level instead - something outside of the device has to detect the suspicious traffic that such an attack must generate in order to be useful. That in turn requires that the networking gear has to be trustworthy and not itself owned by the attacker or have any backdoors installed at the factory (or chip maker, or etc etc).

Comment Re:Oh, Hell NO! (Score 1) 324

China is the only one in that group that has any actual chance. The other two would not last a month in a ground war against the US military when it is in full-blown combat mode. One nuclear attack, even an EMP strike, would not defeat the USA, though it would be badly wounded for a period of time, and the attacker would most certainly be cluster-nuked into oblivion in retaliation.

Comment Re:Network segmentation (Score 2) 232

I call shenanigans. This type of breach shouldn't be remotely possible if the cardholder data environment (CDE) was behind a proper firewall as per the PCI specifications. That means that anything that stores card data has a VERY short whitelist of what it may communicate with, and then only on the bare-minimum of ports. And no, just a VLAN won't cut it there. All of the registers, card readers, internal servers, switches, etc on which the card data flows are required to be firewalled both inbound and outbound to the absolute bare-bones minimum possible. Someone, somewhere, trusted something internal to the network but outside of the CDE, that something was compromized, and out poured cardholder data like a firehose. Or they just said they firewalled and segmented without actually doing it.

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