Sounds kinda like the base rate fallacy to me.

But proof of what? If I observe what appears to be water, is that proof that I'm observing actual water? (I'm thinking of mirage situations.)

Insofar as our senses are fallible, an observation that appears to be an X can only be evidence, not proof, that one has observed an actual X.

I have to wonder what you mean by "faith" here. Are you of the opinion that there is not (or perhaps, cannot be) sufficient evidence to render a belief that God does not exist rational to hold?

I think the need for "proof" before believing something to be true is wrongheaded. "Proof" is the kind of thing one gets in mathematics. I haven't got a proof that Washington was the first president, that I have a brother, or that the sun will rise tomorrow; but I believe each of those things. What I do have, however, is quite a lot of evidence that those things are true. Am I being irrational, by your lights?

But replacing "proof" with "evidence" leaves your main thesis in a questionable position. Because the theist will be quick to point out that he *does* have evidence for his position: the testimony of those who profess to have had experiences with God, the existence of some holy book which purports to be about the deity in question, and a plethora of arguments from natural theology. I'm not suggesting that these things constitute *sufficient* evidence, or even especially strong evidence. But they are evidence.

I might suggest a reformulation along Clifford's lines: "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence."

Assuming one follows that maxim, and assuming that there is insufficient evidence to believe the proposition "God exists" either true or false, one would seem to be more agnostic than atheist.

I'll ignore the condescension, since you actually follow it up by talking about the argument itself.

We can choose our beliefs? Even with a libertarian view of free will, it isn't simply a given that we are capable of choosing our beliefs. You need some kind of doxastic voluntarism to be true, for this to be an objection to the argument. Do you have any evidence that this is the case?

Nothing in the argument entails that a perfectly loving God must directly communicate with his creation. This is nothing more than a red herring.

Not quite. A perfectly loving God would want everyone to believe that he exists, because such a belief is required for a mutually explicit, meaningful love relationship to exist between God and his creations. I don't know what else "perfectly loving" could mean, other than the desire to participate in such a relationship with everyone who was willing.

Not much else to respond to here.

Well, that's fine with me, I suppose. I just think it is curious that you keep repeating how "pointless" and "circular" this argument is, yet you don't actually bother to point out how it is so. As it doesn't seem like you're interested in an actual exchange, I'm done now.

I'm not sure at all what to make of your "warnings". Do you not think it important to understand the meanings of the words we use, or to aim for precision in that understanding? If your understanding of "unsurpassable" (note: not simply "unsurpassed") or "perfectly loving" differs from mine, that's fine. But to suggest that there's some harm in being exacting when talking about these issues seems a little odd.

Well, sure. This argument only "works" if you understand "God" to be a perfect or unsurpassable being. If you don't think God is such a thing, then it probably doesn't apply to whatever that thing is. But that's very different than the enterprise of natural theology/atheology being a waste of time.

Nah. If it is going to be formalized, it will look something more like:

1. A -> B
2. B -> ~C
3. C
4. ~B
5. ~A

And that's how the argument should be understood.

Well, I'm not the person you asked. But I'll give it a go.

1) If there is a God, he is perfectly loving.
2) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable non-belief in the existence of God does not occur.
3) Reasonable non-belief in the existence of God does occur.
4) No perfectly loving God exists.
5) There is no God. (Schellenberg 1993: 83)

Sadly, this isn't even valid. At least the modern, three-premise version of the argument (as defended by William Lane Craig) has that going for it. However, something like this is appropriated by Craig as justification for his second premise. Unfortunately, his arguments for the impossibility of an "actual infinite" fail just as badly.

If you mean to say that "God does not exist," cannot possibly be the conclusion of a sound argument, you're simply wrong. Indeed there are many valid arguments which would serve as candidates (evil, hiddenness, etc.).

Well, I think it's certainly plausible that, although Jacob's brother was the smoke monster we saw active on the island, he wasn't the *only* smoke monster that has ever existed on the island. There were people on the island before Jacob/MiB ever got there. Doesn't seem too much of a stretch to imagine that the MiB wasn't the first guy to get tossed down the golden-hole (indeed, the skeletons we see down there attest to that).

That's all well and good, I suppose. But when you pay money for an online good and the seller reneges on the deal to deliver, just don't come crying to the government-run courts or police, okay?

(Emphasis mine)

What exactly is the "true value of the stock"? If your answer has anything to do with the future (future revenue, future earnings, etc.), please explain how you're able to know the "true value" of anything which has yet to happen.