what i am saying is that you are naive for assuming that your silly suggestion of hardcoding a proxy will solve the problem. you completely ignore the fact that there is a gaping hole in your security recommendation by trivializing the design option of a malware author.
by the way, you can import the "bulky" IE COM ojbect and use it without a gui and without security-warning pop ups because, you know, the malware author didn't decide to put the gui and security warnings in his code. oh and the IE COM object (a) makes it harder to detect since it could just be a legitimate user using IE, (b) IE is tried and tested, a malware's http stack could be buggy, leave identifying footprints, (c) saves the malware author time from reinventing the wheel.
in security it is *ALSO* about the lowest common denominator. great woohoo, you can stop malware that doesn't follow the rules of your network. you cannot ignore malicious software that does follow the rules of the network. you're fooling only yourself if you believe malware can't evolve (did we not realize this the first time when a virtualized rootkit was as powerful as the first offerings of vm software?)
-aEN