Re:I disapprove of Approval Voting (Score 1)

Actually, Arrow's Impossiblity Theorem only applies to ranked-preference voting systems. Approval voting (and it's generalization, range voting, where you give points over [0,1] rather than just the endpoints) gets around this by allowing voters to be more expressive than simple rankings. Look at the statements that the theorem covers, and let's consider range voting over [0,1] (approval voting is an approximation to this that works when n is large): Non-dictatorship, unrestricted domain, and non-imposition are obvious. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: Clearly, if voters assign candidate A n points and B m points, then adding a candidate C, with voters own preferences for them, does not change the points assigned to A or B. Pareto Efficiency: If everybody prefers A to B, they will assign A more points than B, so clearly A will have more total points and be preferred. Range voting, and, by extension, approval voting, satisfies all the terms of Arrow's theorem because it gets more information from the voter than a preference ranking.