The entire structure on which science is built on philosophy, which is grounded in trying to answer exactly the kind of questions that lead us ultimately to issues like whether global trends are good or bad for us.
The question of wether or not a global trend is "good for us" is neither a falsifiable proposition, nor is it derivable from methodological naturalism.
So, trend X might kill people. Okay, that's bad, but stopping it might cost Y, how do you weigh the benefits? And you're going to run into people that'll say, "people on Tonga should have to pay for their own evacuation, they must adapt," okay, so why? Other people might say, "It's wrong to make a people run from their home and destroy it simply because we refuse to curtail CO2 emissions," and that's a perfectly valid position too. Science can't tell us which of these solutions is correct.
And in all these cases we aren't really talking about how we know something is bad. Death is bad, we can stipulate that, but why? Maybe you'd say that it violates Kantian ethics, it violates the Golden Rule, that's fine. Maybe you could say that killing people causes a harm, and harms must be avoided according to utilitarian ethics, that's fine too. But neither of these are science. They're humanistic, they avoid Sky Father, but it's impossible to prove they're right from completely materialistic, naturalistic priors.