BIOS4breakfast writes: Research presented at CanSecWest has shown that despite the fact that we know that firmware attackers, in the form of the NSA, definitely exists, there is still a wide gap between the attackers' ability to infect firmware, and the industry's ability to detect their presence. The researchers from MITRE and Intel showed attacks on UEFI SecureBoot, the BIOS itself, and BIOS forensics software. Although they also released detection systems for supporting more research and for trustworthy BIOS capture, the real question is, when is this going to stop being the domain of research and when are security companies going to get serious about protecting against attacks at this level? Link to Original Source
"And do you think (fop that I am) that I could be the Scarlet Pumpernickel?"
-- Looney Tunes, The Scarlet Pumpernickel (1950, Chuck Jones)