In Search of Stupidity 183
Ben Rothke writes "In
Search of Stupidity gets
its title from the classic, albeit infamous business book In Search of Excellence: Lessons from
America's Best-Run Companies, by Tom Peters and Robert Waterman. In Search of Excellence quickly became a
best-seller when it came out in 1988 and launched a new era of management consultants and business books. But in 2001, Peters admitted that he
falsified the underlying data. Librarians have been slow to move the book to the fiction section." Read the rest of Ben's review.
| In Search of Stupidity: Over Twenty Years of High Tech Marketing Disasters, Second Edition | |
| author | Merrill Chapman |
| pages | 373 |
| publisher | Apress |
| rating | 9 |
| reviewer | Ben Rothke |
| ISBN | 1590597214 |
| summary | Excellent analysis of hi-tech software marketing disasters |
In Search of Stupidity is not a traditional business book; rather, it's a high-level analysis of marketing mistakes made by some of the biggest and most well-known high-tech companies over the last 20 years. The book contains numerous stories of somewhat smart companies that have made stupid marketing mistakes. The catastrophe is that these mistakes have led to the demise of many of these companies.
For those who have been in technology for a while, the book will be a somewhat nostalgic look at what has happened over the years from the world of high-tech marketing. Combined with Chapman's often hilarious observations, the book is a most enjoyable and fascinating read and is hard to put down once you start.
The first chapters of the book discuss the story and mythology around the origins of DOS. It details such luminaries as Digital Research, IBM, Microsoft, Bill Gates and Gary Kildall and more. The first myth about Microsoft is the presumption that the original contract with IBM for MS-DOS gave Microsoft an immediate and unfair advantage over its competitors. The reality is that over time, MS-DOS did indeed become Microsoft's cash cow; but it took the idiocy of Apple, IBM and others to make this happen.
The book also notes that throughout its history, Microsoft would consistently make the most of its competitor's mistakes and stupidity to its advantage. The book repeatedly notes that yes, Microsoft has not always been ethical or nice; but the reality is that such behavior has also been practiced by many in the software industry. Not that it rationalizes what Microsoft has done, and to a degree still does. But it is unfair to pinpoint Microsoft as the sole miscreant in the dirty software waters.
For the better part of the last decade, Microsoft has owned the desktop. But that was not always the case. In the early 1990's IBM was frantically working on its nascent OS/2 operating system, working alongside Microsoft as a trusted partner. IBM had the cash and talent to ensure that OS/2 would own the desktop. So why did OS/2 miserably fail? It was primarily IBM's own ineptitude in marketing OS/2 which led to Windows 95 taking over the desktop. The desktop was IBM's to lose and that is precisely what it did.
Microsoft at one point was working with IBM to develop OS/2 and many have written that Microsoft took advantage of IBM in that joint effort. But Chapman writes that complete and direct responsibility for the failure of OS/2 falls completely on IBM. He notes that it is difficult to find a marketing mistake around OS/2 that IBM did not make. At the time, the market was ready to accept almost any GUI and it was Microsoft that gave the people what they wanted. It was not so much that Microsoft beat IBM; rather that IBM imploded with OS/2 and Microsoft was there to pick up the pieces.
As to ownership of the desktop, Chapman notes that even with Microsoft's near endless budget, bullying tactics, and use of the FUD factor, those alone did not enable Microsoft to monopolize the desktop operating system market. Chapman notes that the following key factors, all which are unrelated and out of Microsoft's control had to take place in order for that to happen.
First, Xerox, the original inventor of the GUI had to never develop a clue about how to commercialize the groundbreaking product that came out of its own labs. Digital Research then had to blow off IBM when it came calling to them for an operating systems for the original IBM PC. IBM would then have to fall victim to Microsoft during its joint development of OS/2.
Finally, Apple would have to decide not to license the Macintosh operating system. That decision led Apple to have a 30% share of the desktop market in the early 1990's to its current irrelevant 4% share.
Chapman lists numerous secondary factors that also contributed to Microsoft's dominance. While the accepted wisdom is that Microsoft single-handedly cornered the desktop operating system market; the reality is that the ultimate success of Microsoft is as much a result of their near endless good luck combined with the recurring stupidity of its competition.
The stupidity of IBM and Apple gave the desktop market to Microsoft. Similarly, Novell gave the NOS market to them. In the mid-1990's, Novell owned the NOS market. Netware along with myriad CNE's (Certified Network Engineerswere the dominant force in network computing. When Windows NT version 3.1 shipped (it was really version 1.0), it was clearly inferior to Netware, as myriad product reviews stated.
Yet a few years later, Windows NT was the dominant NOS and Novell was struggling. While Netware was clearly superior to NT from a functionality perspective, the genius of Microsoft was that it knew better how to deal and communicate with its development community. Today, Netware is an irrelevant NOS and Novell has effectively abandoned it to primarily focus on its Linux strategy.
Exactly at the same time Microsoft was pushing Windows NT and wooing developers, Novell shutdown its third-party development center in Austin, TX. Novell also became preoccupied with its misguided purchase of WordPerfect. Novell developers were left hanging until Microsoft came calling with its promises of NT development and marketing support. Similarly, it was Novell failures that directly lead to the success of Windows NT.
Novell had myriad chances to decimate Windows, but it never stepped up to the plate. Novell's inexperienced marketing department thought that "if you built a great NOS, they would come." But come they did not, and leave Netware they did.
It is chapter 10 that will likely give Slashdot readers a fit. The author attempts to set straight additional myths around Microsoft: that their products are of poor quality, that they have only succeeded because of its market monopolies, that they are not innovative, and more. For those who want all of the details, they should read the book. But the authors notes for example that while Microsoft has been widely criticized for not being an innovative company, it is no different from companies such as Lotus, Borland, Xerox and more.
Most recently, when Microsoft found itself behind the 8-ball and lacking a browser, Internet Explorer was quickly developer and in time, surpassed the capability of Netscape Navigator. By 1998, most reviews were giving IE a higher rating than Navigator. Of course, Microsoft has more cash and developers than Netscape, but that alone was not what doomed them. Simultaneously, Netscape derailed itself in an attempt to completely rewrite Navigator in Java. This led them to the state where they would permanently fall behind Microsoft in the development race.
The book contains 12 chapters each with a different set of stupid marketing actions. Rather than simply being a Monday morning quarterback, chapter 14 contains an analysis of each scenario and what the respective companies should have done.
In Search of Stupidity: Over Twenty Years of High Tech Marketing Disasters is a most valuable book and is a wonderful read for anyone in the software industry. For those in sales and marketing, it is clearly required reading, and in fact, should be reread periodically. While In Search of Excellence turned out to be a fraud, In Search of Stupidity is genuine, and no names have been changed to protect the guilty.
You can purchase In Search of Stupidity: Over Twenty Years of High Tech Marketing Disasters, Second Edition from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
Executive Summary (Score:5, Insightful)
The entire book is on Microsoft? (Score:5, Insightful)
catastrophe? (Score:3, Insightful)
Maybe this is a fine point, but I can think of a lot of catastrophes in the last 20 years and none of them has to do with the demise of any company. I know it may be traumatic for those involved but catastrophe seems a bit strong. And from what I gather from the review, most of the companies mentioned still exist, though they are possibly not as dominant as they once were.
Questionable points (Score:5, Insightful)
In reading the review, I was struck by several points.
Microsoft did have a big advantage when the first IBM PCs were shipped: MS-DOS, under the name of PC-DOS, was shipped by default. You could get (IIRC) CP/M-86 or the UCSD p-system, but most people had no reason to do so. I would think that Microsoft did have a big advantage with the first contract, contrary to what the reviewer says.
Nor is the account of how Microsoft won the desktop at all correct. By the time there was a Windows 95, Microsoft had already won. Windows 3.1 and Windows for Workgroups were standard, and the question at the companies I knew was whether to upgrade to 95 or NT. IBM's OS/2 was not so much a competitor as a challenger. The real story is back when Windows first came out, and was competing with several other desktops for the IBM PC and clones. They were all crappy products then, including Windows, but Windows came out on top. Why? The reviewer does not suggest that the book has much to say about this.
The view of Apple seems odd, to say the least. I don't think the Macintosh ever had near 30% of the marketshare. If we're talking about the Apple II, that went the way of the other major systems when the IBM PC came out, and there was nothing Apple could do about it. Anything that wasn't strictly compatible with the IBM PC was a fringe market at best. Radio Shack's Tandy 2000 was a superior product, with its own versions of the major software of the time, and it tanked. The major problem Apple had was not that it didn't license its software, but that its software was not IBM-compatible. Licensing the Macintosh OS might have helped, or it might have hurt, but it couldn't have given Apple a 30% market share. This gives me the feeling that the author doesn't understand the issues, and just makes assumptions as to what would work.
In short, this is not a convincing review. It suggests that the book is inaccurate, glosses over important issues, and makes unwarranted assumptions when convenient.
Chicago was vaporware for years, true (Score:4, Insightful)
And the reason for this is simple: preloads. Consumers very rarely upgrade their operating system. Instead they prefer to run the system that their computer came with. This holds true to today where Microsoft's largest competitor for Vista is itself because no one wants to upgrade without a compelling reason. And IBM couldn't get any of its competitors (Compaq, HP, NEC, DEC, Packard-Bell, etc.) to preload OS/2 for a very simple reason, none of them wanted to be beholden to one of their largest rivals for an operating system.
Microsoft "innovation" (Score:4, Insightful)
Digital Research DID provide an OS to IBM (Score:3, Insightful)
1. DOS had an amazing (for the time) street price of $49 and was out first.
2. CP/M came later had a street price around $225
3. Game over.
Did Gates not devlop, but rather buy, DOS from Seattle Computer Products and push it out? Yes.
Did Gates know OEM's business model from selling BASIC to several and price DOS for that? Yes.
chilling effect (Score:5, Insightful)
Apple not licensing is not a Marketing mistake (Score:4, Insightful)
Licensing, I agree, would be a great boon for consumers, but there is no evidence than it would have been good for Apple. It was a conscious decision not to do it because licensing would undermine their hardware sales, which was of course later proven when they actually did license the OS!! Yes they lost market share, but they retained revenues they couldn't get any way else at the time. Therefore calling it a mistake is a typical fallacy that far too many techies and tech business types make because they fail to look at apple's real business model.
This book seems to be a skimming of information from moderated slashdot comments. This might be a good book for someone new to the idea, but there doesn't seem to be anything good here. Plenty of company bashing we've all done before, and nothing new to add. Nothing to see here... move along.
Re:Sounds like a pretty accurate book to me.... (Score:3, Insightful)
The irony here is that the last version of Warp was "Aurora", the should-have-been-v5.0 version that was finally released, in a blaze of no publicity at all, as "OS/2 Warp Server for e-Business". They tried so hard not to sell it that you haven't even heard of it - the policy was to tell nobody but the large enterprise customers about its existence. They'd sell it to you if you asked, but you had to know about it first. It also contained numerous new features over Merlin, that could have been marketed to the public (like the JFS filesystem, AIX-style LVM, a full NFS implementation, etc). Nothing that we're not used to now, but this was in 1999.
Yup... (Score:3, Insightful)
AFAIK the only machine you could ever get OS/2 preloaded on was the crappy PS/1 from freaking Sears. That wasn't going to give anyone who used it a good impression of OS/2. The IBM PC division holds a lot of the blame for the death of OS/2. Of course several other IBM divisions did half-assed jobs of porting IBM Windows software to OS/2. Quite often those applications would do huge processing jobs and freeze up the OS due to the single system input queue. Ironically the windows counterparts of those applications ran better in the Windows emulation in OS/2 than the OS/2 versions did under OS/2. If they'd bothered to do their processing in threads and continued to handle system messages they'd never have had those problems.
Then there the annoying usability issues that IBM never bothered to fix. Hell if you formatted a diskette in OS/2 and left it in the drive over a reboot you'd get an error message like "OS2!!2047/OS2!!2048" during the boot up process and the system would hang. I handled 5 or 6 people a week who had that message on their screen, freaked out and called support. IBM refused to fix it claiming that they had no room on the floppy for an internationalized string library so you HAD to have the numeric error message. I guess so it'd be incomprehensible to everyone. Also, the aforementioned single system input queue -- it seeemd like most OS/2 applications would stop processing messages off the queue and freeze the system up. They came up with a half-assed workaround for it in 3.0 but it never did work as well as it needed to. And the binary-only ini files and extended attributes were a great idea in theory, right up until they got corrupted. Then you may as well just reinstall the damn OS because there was no recovering from that shit. A few of us could beat the system into submission but things would never be the same after your ini files got corrupted.
They seemed to go out of their way to piss off Team OS/2 as well. Oh there were a few "Believers" in IBM and I was one of 'em. I even did the 95 summer COMDEX on my own dime to provide installation and marketing support for the show (I still have a thank you letter from some VP or other.) But the company just seemed to want to kick that anthill at every turn, too. And grassroots fans can be your best friend but if you piss them off they can also be your worst enemy.
Yeah I don't think IBM could have done a better job of killing OS/2 if it had tried to. Too bad there's never any accountability in the IT world -- if I were an investor I'd be pretty angry about the lost opportunity to dominate the software industry the way Microsoft currently does.
Re:Executive Summary (Score:3, Insightful)
And those who do not learn from their history are doomed to repeat it.
Re:What about the Microsoft "head-fake?" (Score:3, Insightful)
I ended up talking quite extensively with an IBM architect at the time. I was impatiently biting my nails, waiting to spend all of my money on a fancy new legacy-free DOS-free IBM computer which would kick the ass of anything else out there. The comment I got back from IBM was, "Well we've got a few things to polish still, so we won't release anything until we're ready. The market will wait for us, if the product is good."
I couldn't believe I was hearing this. The market NEVER waits for the product--least of all in computing. If there's real competition, the first to market wins. Not the best, not the fastest, not even the prettiest, but the best marketed--and the first step in marketing is get to the customer before your competition.
IBM blew it. They completely failed to capitalise on a chance to make a huge change in the PC marketplace. It wasn't Microsoft, it was IBM.
Re:Yes, Re:The entire book is about Microsoft? (Score:2, Insightful)
And you cannot blame it on the users, per se, either.
OS/2 was a failure only because IBM canned it too early -- in 1996, just when the market for OS/2 was finally gaining momentum. And nowadays, if OS/2 still existed, it would be the ideal choice for many users who wanted to escape Windows Vista. Also, banks and insurances would still be using OS/2 (being traditional IBM customers).
Apple and Commodore refused to license their OSes to third parties, which was a grave mistake.
There were plenty of companies who wanted to build Amiga clones, Amiga laptops and notebooks, and so on, but Commodore declined, for instance. Amigas were used by many people just to run MacOS emulators, because the Amiga handled a greater range of peripherals than MacOS did, and was only half as expensive.
The Mac's demise started already in the 80ies, when its pricing policy made it unavailable for the general public. This policy extended far into the 90ies, and MacOS simply was too expensive to be a choice for anyone with a small budget.
This is why Microsoft won against IBM, Apple and Commodore: Windows was comparably cheap, offered more functionality and was easy to develop for.
But Microsoft now makes the same mistakes as once Apple and Commodore: They resort to restrictive licensing, and high pricing, and thus making Windows unavailable for the general masses; at least to the people who do not want to use a pirated product.
I migrated to Linux myself because Windows and associated software simply has become too expensive to afford.
And speaking as a developer, I think that Java currently seems to be the best development platform, because it's platform neutral, and the tools and libraries have great functionality and are well documented.
Re:Executive Summary (Score:3, Insightful)
Well, I understood the review as saying that this is quite true, but it doesn't much matter because the other companies are also underhanded and have inferior products. They just aren't as good at underhanded marketing of inferior products as Microsoft is.
Did I read the review wrong?
(And linux really hasn't been much of a competitor mostly because it wasn't intended as a competitor in the underhanded, inferior-product market. It was designed to be useful to people who know what they're doing and want good tools for their jobs. Linux seems to do rather well in that admittedly small market. What's disappointing is that part of the linux crowd keeps trying to compete in the Microsoft/IBM market, leading them to adopt underhanded tactics and inferior [GUI] tools. I don't want something that mimics the MS/IBM approach, dammit; I want quality tools.