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The U.S.'s Net Wide For 'Terrorist' Names 223

Yesterday's report of name-based blocking of money transfers as a result of U.S. Treasury policies intended to reduce the flow of money to Middle Eastern terrorists drew more than 800 comments. Western Union money transfers were at the heart of the linked Associated Press article, but as some of these comments point out, that's not the only case of interference in electronic financial transactions based on the names of the participants, akin to the use of the much-derided no-fly list. Read on for the Backslash summary of the conversation.

Several readers concentrated not just on the undesirability of government snooping on money transfers in the first place, but on the unintended but likely side-effects of heavy-handed government oversight of conventional money-transfer methods; as the AP article explained, there are ways to route around large-scale commercial services like Western Union, including informal networks called "hundis" or "hawalas." Reader quantaman calls increased control on conventional money-transfer services "worse than useless," writing:

"From what I can gather from the article this policy is actually harming security.

... If law abiding people are avoiding official institutions what makes them think that terrorists are stupid enough to use them?

More than that, by driving additional people to the hawalas it circumvents existing security measures. For starters, it means that more money (even the legit stuff) is moving around and they have no idea where it went. Also the additional people using the hawalas will mean they are more developed for the terrorists [to] use them. Additionally, when you uncover a hawala network it will be that much harder to pick out the terrorists, since you've added all these false positives. And finally, for the terrorists who would have used official institutions in the past since it was easy and the hawalas weren't developed, now you no longer have a money trail you can inspect later on.

All this security measure does is inconvenience and alientate a whole bunch of people while making the world a little less safe."

No matter how legitimate the ends to which it will be put, high-handed interference with the transfer of money isn't popular for other reasons, too. Reader ColourlessGreenIdeas writes "I know of a charity that works with (mostly Christian) organisations in the West Bank. Their usual way of getting money to their partners is to fly into Israel with a big bundle of money. Otherwise it tends to get massively delayed by U.S. banks."

(And at least one reader points out reason to suspect that Western Union in particular might have been willing to turn over information on its customers even in the absence of Treasury regulations.)

The Treasury regulations on which the name-filtering is based are clearly imperfect, but not quite as simplistic as certain comments painted them. Responding to the claim in the AP article that "Western Union prevented [taxi driver Abdul Rahman Maruthayil] from sending $120 to a friend at home last month because the recipient's name was Mohammed," reader lecithin says "Not true. They prevented him from sending the cash because his name was Sahir Mohammed. A bit of a difference. Perhaps a Sahir Mohammed has some links to 'bad guys'? Well, it happens here in the U.S. too. There are plenty of stories regarding people being put on the 'do not fly' list due to circumstances like this as well."

Reader bwcarty, too, calls "FUD" on claims that the list is indiscriminant or exclusively targets those with Arab names, writing "I work for a division of a large financial firm, and we are required to download a list of Specially Designated Nationals from the Treasury Department and compare names from it against new accounts and transfers. The list includes lists of suspected terrorists, and they're not all Arabic (think Irish Republican Army)."

Reader rhsanborn offers a similar account of the regulations and why they affect one-time transfers so significantly:
"... They aren't blocking people because they have some generic Arab name. They are blocking people who have names that match the Federal list of suspected terrorists. As someone mentioned above, something like Sahir Mohammed. Probably a perfect match for the list.

We too have to run periodic checks against the names in that database. If a match comes up, we have people individually check other information to confirm that it is an actual match (e.g. same name, different birthday).

We have open accounts with these people though, so we have a significant amount of time to deal with these. Western Union has a very short period of time because it is a one time transaction that happens relatively quickly."

Several readers related personal experience with the no-fly list, and a few pointed out some of its better-known shortcomings, such as a Soundex-based name database which has the potential to needlessly flag passengers like Senator Ted Kennedy and the former Sex Pistol Johnny Lydon (though as dan828 points out, Lydon has never actually been stopped because of the list).

Many readers denounced as racist the use of common Arab names to justify interference in money transfers. One response to that claim comes from reader mrxak, who offers a more innocuous explanation, namely imperfect information and a limited pool of names, which will inevitably contain variations of commonly used names. Such a system, he argues, is therefore based on pragmatism — not necessarily racism." Arguing that a similar system would pose just as much risk for "John Smiths" on the list as for those with Arab names, mrxak concedes the need for "a better system," and asks "but what kind of system would work?"

To this, reader eln had a ready answer: "Maybe a system where you gather a little more information about suspected terrorists other than their name before throwing them on some sort of list that prevents anyone with that name from doing all sorts of normal tasks. ... [O]f all of the pieces of information that can be used to identify a person, his name is probably the one that's most easily falsified. So, instead of doing some actual police work and gathering some actual evidence against an actual person, we decide to cast a wide net, and end up catching a lot of innocent people while actually decreasing our chances of catching the actual bad guy."

Jah-Wren Ryel's answer to the same question is more radical -- Ryel suggests that perhaps "none at all" is the best approach. He asks "What makes you think that any system could work?" Rather than spending money on elaborate surveillance or other intelligence-gathering efforts, Ryel says, "spend it on emergency services instead. ... No matter how many tax dollars you throw at the problem, terrorism is a tactic that can not be fully countered." Rather than concentrating on the prevention of terrorist acts, he argues, the most intelligent use of resources is on "the infrastructure that minimizes the damage. Better hospitals, better fire departments, better 'first responder' teams. That way, we get the benefit of the money spent regardless of if a terrorist blows up a building or an earthquake knocks it down."

The Israeli response to recurring attacks illustrates that these approaches may be in large part reconcilable; infrastructure improvements and intelligence gathering can certainly coexist, details of their implementation aside. The effectiveness of the pre-emptive side of any nation's approach to minimizing terrorist attacks, though, is slightly different from its approach to "fighting terror" in a broad sense.

On that note, reader karlandtanya describes measures such as the U.S. policies subjecting what might otherwise be private financial transactions to automated scrutiny as "effective, but still unfair," categorizing the use of name-based interference as what Bruce Schneier has described as "security theater." Karlandtanya writes, cynically, that in reaction to perceived security threats, "we present the appearance of security measures. Going overboard and causing outrage is just part of the salesmanship." To combat terror in a literal sense, he writes, "[t]he solution is, of course, the perception of security."


Thanks to all the readers whose comments informed the conversation, in particular to those whose comments are quoted above.
This discussion has been archived. No new comments can be posted.

The U.S.'s Net Wide For 'Terrorist' Names

Comments Filter:
  • Actually, Ted Kennedy got banned from flying temporarily once because his name was too close to a terrorist alias...
  • Re:Spam Filtering (Score:2, Interesting)

    by botzi ( 673768 ) on Friday July 07, 2006 @04:06PM (#15678850)
    >>.but how exactly does one heuristically determine a persons 'terror score' without bio data?

    So, we should be ready to provide bio data, place & date of birth and all that just to send 200 USD to a person on the other side of the world AND we should pretend the whole system is actually making our lives more secure?? Anybody who believes that money transfer control has anything to do with terrorrists needs a headcheck. Sure, criminals are not brilliant, but NOBODY is that dumb. As it has already been pointed out, fake identites go 2 for dollar in most parts of the world.
  • by nebaz ( 453974 ) * on Friday July 07, 2006 @04:23PM (#15678998)
    If we were actually in a declared state of war (i.e. Congress actually made a declaration of war, something not done since WWII), like we were when all of those other Presidents did those things, I would have much less of a problem with what is happening. As is, we are in an open ended 'war', which is not a war, not that there isn't combat going on, but it NOT a war. Not to pull a Godwin's Law, but a perpetual state of war is one of the tricks used in 1984 as a justification of rights suppression tactics. Can you honestly envision an end to this war on terror? The war on drugs is still going on. The price for freedom is eternal vigilence, and not buying into the bull of 'well we're at war'. No we're not. We're in an undeclared combat situation on two fronts.
  • by Anonymous Coward on Friday July 07, 2006 @04:25PM (#15679024)
    You know, owning up to past mistakes and dealing with them could instantly fix all of these problems. You cannot set up a working system because you're dealing with people who are passionate and determined to finds ways to beat that system.

    Instead, deal with the root causes.

    1) Realize that the occupation in Israel creates more problems than it solves.

    Cut them off. The reason why the IDF gets away with treating the Palestinians like human cattle is because it knows it's backed by the US. Unfortunately, treating the Palestinians this way motivates a lot of support for the resistance against Israel.

    2) Realize that the relationship with Saudi Arabia creates more problems than it solves.

    The US was on its way to being a leader in hybrid cars. That program got killed, presumably so a lot of rich people can stay rich, while repeating the words "infeasible" over and over to the public and hoping they buy it. Never mind what the potential environmental benefits are, the main reason for 9/11 was America's military presence in Islam's Holy Land. Do your research -- everything points back to that, from Bin Laden's long-standing vendetta against them to the large number of 9/11 hijackers, etc. Besides oil, what benefit is there to being aligned with the Saudi Royals?

    3) Realize that the occupation in Iraq creates more problems than it solves.

    No WMDs, no threat. There is no reason to be there. Instability in the Middle East? That's a set of falling dominoes that started decades ago, and the American invasion in Iraq is easily shown to have just made it worse. Just write it all off and let them sort out their problems for themselves.

    Deal with these three THIS MORNING and your problems with terrorism dry up THIS AFTERNOON.
  • Re:Flaimebaiting... (Score:5, Interesting)

    by Hrodvitnir ( 101283 ) on Friday July 07, 2006 @05:01PM (#15679286)
    George W. Bush has neither committed, nor ordered to have committed a single Act of Terror.

    1. Terrorism [m-w.com] : the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion.

    2. Bush took the U.S. to a pre-emptive war without the approval of Congress.

    3. Shock and Awe was used to corce Iraqis into civil war.
  • by Larus ( 983617 ) on Friday July 07, 2006 @05:27PM (#15679506)
    It's politics as usual. An acquaintance who is half Iranian said once: if you ever want to transport anything in and out of Iran, you talk to the Kurds. If you ever want to transfer any funds in and out of Middle East, you talk to the Kurds. Do we see the government specifically target the Kurds in the route of trading? Heaven forbid. They are the oppressed ethnic group, and anything they do are justified. The name filtering is about as useful as airport screening - it shows the government is doing something with your tax money, but ultimately achieves nyet.
  • by orbitalia ( 470425 ) on Friday July 07, 2006 @05:29PM (#15679528) Homepage
    If you traceroute to www.msn.com, or www.hp.com, or a bunch of other high profile sites you will see they are actually being redirected to nsact.net first. NSA Cable Tap anyone? nsact.net is owned by savvis who have had many projects together with the NSA before.

    most backbone providers have a 'secret' NSA tap room..
    http://wired.com/news/technology/0,70910-0.html [wired.com]

    And you all sit idly by..
  • Dammit. I'm blocked! (Score:4, Interesting)

    by Frightening ( 976489 ) on Friday July 07, 2006 @06:17PM (#15679844) Homepage
    Hello there,

    My first name is Ahmed, and parts of my family name contain the word Hamza. Apparently, I'm an effing terrorist. Nice to meet you too. No, no, the pleasure is all mine.

    The problem with the list matching scheme is that although it is slightly more effective than unordered pattern matching with name derivations, it still sucks. Those of us who are terrorist have a nasty habit of

    a) Having perfectly normal/popular first & family names (Ahmed is like Dave, but more popular)
    b) Making up nicks to improve their boring names(e.g Abu-Mus'ab) so that they cover the entire range of human nomenclature.
    c) Not using wiring services under names that are on FBI wanted lists.

    So in the end, it's the good guys like me who end up getting screwed.
    I've always hated Western Union. Now I have a reason to blow them up, or send them hatemail. Or something. But they're already onto me. I know it.

    I probably won't get a chance to fi
  • by digitalgimpus ( 468277 ) on Friday July 07, 2006 @08:42PM (#15680631) Homepage
    Ok, so when a transfer is done, the transfer amount is imediately deducted from the account it's sent from...

    And technically put in a temporary account, until it clears and hits the destination account.

    Now if the transfer is held, for "security" reasons... the amount of money in question still exists, and sits in a bank account...

    who gets the interest? Does the financial firm keep it? Do the feds steal it? Does it go to the origin account holder (even though interest isn't earned on that account)? Or to the destination (even though the interest wasn't collected on that account)?

    Remember, all these firms don't keep cash in a drawer in the back room... it's electronic transfers between bank accounts.

    Could I start one of these companies, delay random large transfers, and make profit off of the interest I keep on my bank account?

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