What's Missing From File / Disk Encryption? 177
lockDrive asks: "Every month, we read a news about personal information leak. Most of the time, either a laptop or a hard disk that contains sensitive information is stolen from a government or corporate office, and the data are not encrypted. Recently, Department of Veterans Affairs had lost a laptop which contained confidential information for 26.5 million veterans. The data were not encrypted. There are many products that provide a solution to such a problem. Microsoft Encrypting File System (EFS), which comes with Windows 2000 and later, encrypts data in a file system and seems to have a decent key recovery system in Windows 2003 Server CA. Products like SecureDoc and DriveCrypt encrypt an entire disk. I have tried some of them and they are not that difficult to use. What is holding people who handle sensitive information (government, health-care, insurance ...) back from encrypting their data? Are the products still too hard to use? Are they concerned about performance loss? Are they not convinced with the security gain? Are they just not adopting the technology quickly? Is there anything missing in the technology?"
Time (Score:3, Interesting)
encryption is a speed bump. (Score:4, Insightful)
on a positive note, someone suddenly looking for breaking tools might catch some attention. on a negative note, something encrypted tends to be a big red flag that says 'look at me, i was important enough to protect'.
and one final thought: it you look at the care and attention that people pay to to security, it would not surprise me if most encrypted systems would be compromised by user stupidity (social engineering).
eric
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:2)
-sirket
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:2)
-sirket
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:2)
Nitpick: You meant to say that 50% of the population is below median.
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:2)
In the case of a non-normal distribution, such as income, your point is valid.
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:2)
True, but OP wasn't talking about IQ tests.
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:2)
I assumed OP meant below average intelligence. I guess it could refer to body mass or hair length, but idiot refers to intelligence. Intelligence is measured by IQ tests. So I decided to have fun with a correction to a correction.
Mental deficiency used to be divided into the following sub-classifications, but these labels began to be abused by the public and are now largel
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:5, Funny)
I keep one of the twins, Alice, in the firesafe to prevent this kind of attack. Bob is kept offsite as a backup.
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:3, Insightful)
(Or maybe you're just using some unusual naming scheme [wikipedia.org] for your kids.)
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:4, Insightful)
Note that when "eventually" is a timeframe measured in tens to hundreds of years, that's probably good enough for just about anyone.
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:2)
That's 3,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000, 000,000,000,000,000,000,000 years.
This is WAY longer than the universe has been in existence and probably longer than it will continue to exist in the future. That's just counting the keys. Actually testing them would probably slow your key rate down significantly.
The math as I see it:
1 trillion keys per second = 2^40
2^40
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:2)
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:2)
It could be that your first guess would work. It is unlikely, but possible.
It is just as unlikely that it will be your last guess that works.
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:2)
So 32768 kajillion years becomes merely 16384 kajillion years, on average.
Computers keep getting faster, but huge random keys are hard.
The key cracking math for those who are interested (Score:2)
"slow people down- _MAYBE_ long enough?" If 2^191 years isn't long enough to change your passwords then the only possible reason is that you are dead.
Just the act of counting from 1 to 2^256 at a rate of 1 trillion keys per second would take approximately 2^191 years (3 x 10^57).
That's 3,000,000,000
Not in the real world. (Score:2)
Crypto today is about brute force. And it's about how you CANNOT brute force a crypto key with current hardware. And this isn't about Moore's law, we need fundamentally different hardware to be able to crack current crypto techinques.
This is why the only reliable way to br
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:4, Informative)
You'd better re-think that bold assertion...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Stan
But it's only DES, you say!!! So. It is a correctly-encrypted text, and it was cracked in 56 hours.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EFF_DES_cracker [wikipedia.org]
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:2)
Re:encryption is a speed bump. (Score:2)
Yes, you do need all that. A compromised encryption algorithm allows a person to re
Re:Use IDE password (Score:2)
Completely untrue. Take the controller board off an identical (but not locked) drive, put it on the "locked" drive, and bang!, you have the data. Alternatives include sending the drive to a data recovery shop to have them read the data off the platters with an electron microscope.
If your data's not encrypted on the platters, it's easily readable.
That reminds me- (Score:3, Interesting)
I would prefer there not be any chance of the OS leaving around un-encrypted information on the swap partition or hacing a back door or any other stupidity. I've seen encrypted controllers but only with 40 bit keys. I'd love to see something with an AES 256 bit key. If nothing is out there I may just have to put together something using an FPGA.
-sirket
Re:That reminds me- (Score:2)
Re:That reminds me- (Score:2)
Re:That reminds me- (Score:2)
Re:That reminds me- (Score:2)
Re:That reminds me- (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:That reminds me- (Score:2)
Mainly because it is so easy to set up. I haven't set up any other type of encryption because it isn't as easy, but if I ever decide to in the future, I already have part of the work done. Also setup m /tmp directory as a tmpfs filesystem. Now stuff written there really is temporary.
Re:That reminds me- (Score:2)
if you don't encrypt your swap, then you will leak cleartext onto your hard drive. How big of a problem this is depends on how determined the attacker is. I think that since it is at least as easy if not easier than other forms of encryption, encypted swap is not overkill at all.
Re:That reminds me- (Score:2)
Not if you're using GPG, which tells the operating system to lock pages into memory (i.e. never swap them to disk). Ironically, this is also how iTunes keeps you from getting at decrypted DRM music.
See mlock(2).
Re:That reminds me- (Score:2)
-truecrypt? (Score:3, Interesting)
http://www.truecrypt.org/ [truecrypt.org]
Its not a HW controler, but a mount the file system encrypted. It seems like a well thought idea anyway. And available for Linux.
Re:-truecrypt? (Score:2)
Re:-truecrypt? (Score:4, Informative)
I also wonder about "...and realize that there is an encrypted partion...". Again, so what? Unless you've chosen an insecure passphrase, or give up the passphrase through some manner of coersion with the strong encryption algorithms, it doesn't matter if someone realizes there might be more to the noise or not. And, if you're really worried about it, Truecrypt allows you to create truely hidden encrypted areas.
I suggest reading the fine manual that comes with Truecrypt and studying the bit about plausible deniability. And the bit about encrypting whole devices. *Then* come back and bring a informed opinion.
The fact of the matter is that the technical problems have been mostly addressed. The problem is that the wetware doesn't follow reasonable data security policies.
Re:-truecrypt? (Score:3)
I sugg
Re:-truecrypt? (Score:3, Interesting)
Hardware encryption? Hah! Ask the Xbox devs how well that worked for them. Given access to the hardware, it will be broken. But
But mocking aside, check this out: Can I relocate the Windows temp directory somewhere else? Yes. Can I change the loc
Re:-truecrypt? (Score:2)
Otherwise parts of your virtual machine could end up on the disk in plaintext- e.g. you run out of memory it gets swapped (does happen sometimes).
Plausible Deniability (Score:3, Interesting)
The really great thing about TrueCrypt, as I see it, is plausible deniability. This means that you can "nest" volumes and o
Re:-truecrypt? (Score:3, Insightful)
I don't think this level of deniability can be done.
Your system needs to know it should ask for a password before it can access the disk. How can this be done so that a third party cannot deduce from the hardware that the disk contains encrypted information? We must assume that the third party has access to all hardware including any special disk controllers, custom FPGA solutions or BIOSes. IMO this means that a sufficiently smart third party can always conclude that the system contains encrypted data,
Re:-truecrypt? (Score:2)
Re:-truecrypt? (Score:3, Informative)
Integrity of the inner volume seems quite fragile, due to the possibility of it being overwritten
Integrity of the inner volume (Score:2)
This could be a plus. If you were ever foricbly made release your key to the outer volume then you could keep "secretfiles.tar" sitting around so that a less skilled attacker would untar it and in the process destroy the inner volume.
Re:Integrity of the inner volume (Score:2)
Of course, by bias is towards preservation of data. The idea of deliberately destroying valuable data gives me the willies.
Re:-truecrypt? (Score:2)
Re:-truecrypt? (Score:2)
No, you don't. [slashdot.org]
Re:-truecrypt? (Score:3, Funny)
That could be good. Let's say they're investigating you for drug trafficing, but really you're planning to overthrow the government and all the plans are on your hard drive. OK, so they assume "the worst" and that you're a big drug dealer, and they throw you in prison for 15 years or something. Meanwhile, your rebel co-conspirators weren't revealed, and they successfully overthrew the government. Obviously you are freed from jail, and everyone is happy. (I should writ
Re:[FOSS] TrueCrypt (Score:2)
TrueCrypt was recently covered & promoted by Steve Gibson,
author of SpinRite, in his Security-Now! podcast (no. 41).
'looks good & fast; is it?
TIA
Bad idea (Score:2)
2) Don't trust hardware crypto. You didn't write it, can't read it. The NSA probably pwns the keys. Do crypto in software with peer-reviewed open source.
Too paranoid. (Score:2)
Think of it this way -- do you regularly dissemble your keyboard and check for keyloggers embedded in it by the manufacturer? Could you tell the difference if one was part of its controller anyway? What about your motherboard?
And, even then, who built the chip fab? How do you know there isn't someone there changing your design before it actually gets to the silicon? And changing the visual on whatever microscope you're using?
For that matter, how do y
Re:Too paranoid. (Score:2)
So why not make that "something" peer reviewed open source software, rather than some black piece of plastic inside your machine? Sure, the CPU could be specifically looking for your sooper seekret data, but that's not really likely (because it's too hard).
Crypto is all about mitigating risk, and using software that you can trust is helpful for acheiving that goal.
Here's an idea: (Score:4, Informative)
Modify the initrd so it asks for a password before setting up the "real" root device on your harddrive.
Burn the install CD with the modified initrd. Install linux using this disk (so it installs onto the now-encrypted hard drive)
In order to use the system, you'll have to insert the install CD and use it as a boot CD everytime. But in this fashion no un-encrypted data is on any of your hard drives. To remove evidence that you can even access it, remove the CD when you're done using the computer, and store it in an inconspicous place.
If you prefer using windows, deal with linux to the point you can install QEMU or VMWare. Install Windows normally in the virtual environment and it is encrypted as well (including the swap file!).
Article: July 31, 2003 (Score:2)
Re:You're looking for Vista (Score:2)
-sirket
Vaporware (Score:2)
Note also that this thing has already been announced for a solid year. Even if you had one, you wouldn'
data loss (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:data loss (Score:2)
You're screwed if you use an obscure crypto format.
And along those lines (Score:3, Informative)
Re:And along those lines (Score:2)
Re:And along those lines (Score:2)
The real cause... (Score:4, Insightful)
It Will NeverHappen To Me
Re:The real cause... (Score:2)
Ignorance (Score:5, Interesting)
It's not a technological problem -- everyone in Windows & Linux land should be using Truecrypt [truecrypt.org] or something similar and being smart about how they handle data. Rather it's a social problem.
lack of proper policies (Score:4, Interesting)
Without written security policies, nobody knows what they should/can/must not do, and even if they do, they follow the rules inconsistently.
Take a look at Cisco's SAFE [cisco.com], for example. It explicitly says
If you don't know what you have, who gets to access it, and when, what good is a bunch of hardware and software? You might as well hand all your workers CDs of your databases and cross your fingers. Which, possibly, actually happens in some of these cases. Sadly, this sort of stuff is Day 1 material for CCNA and MCSE and other certifications these days, so it pretty much looks like whoever is running the show in these places can't follow or doesn't know standard industry practices. That's gross negligence, IMO, and nothing to do with any sort of technical failings.
What's missing (Score:2)
For example, Department A installs an encrypted file-system for a CRM database; Department B, who work with a portion of that data, allow for offline backups onto their users unprotected laptops, inevitably, one of the laptops is lost or stolen, and someone finds unencrypted data all over it.
The only possible solution to this is a really pervasive security policy th
How about a distro w/ initial install support (Score:5, Interesting)
Re:How about a distro w/ initial install support (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:How about a distro w/ initial install support (Score:2)
Have her
Re:How about a distro w/ initial install support (Score:4, Informative)
Re:How about a distro w/ initial install support (Score:2)
What's missing? (Score:3, Insightful)
I don't care if your algorithm never exposes a weakness for ten thousand years and your messages are supposedly secret for ten billion. If you keep throwing your scratchpad in the wastebasket and leaving it there, for example, then I'll probably figure out your plaintext.
I work for a bank and... (Score:2)
There's still the problem with bad employees copying things off on CDs, floppies, emailing sensitive stuff out, but as far as theft of PCs/laptops, we're covered.
Re:I work for a bank and... (Score:2)
Re:I work for a bank and... (Score:2)
When I turn my PC on, it goes through the normal POST process, I get the BIOS screen, then I get a login screen. I have to put in a user name and password. Without this, the computer goes no further. Try too many times with a bad password and it locks up. Gotta call the help desk and they have to unlock it, after verifying who you are.
Is that enough info? There's lots of different products on the market and I'm not going
Re:I work for a bank and... (Score:2)
Thus, it's something like Pointsec; http://www.pointsec.com/ [pointsec.com]. That's what they use on all laptops where I work. This is not an endorsement, by the way; I never used it.
Excess fear, insufficient will (Score:2)
So encrypting offsite backups is a big step, and unless it's done right it can be seriously counterp
Cooperation between Linux and Windows? (Score:2, Interesting)
One of the major reasons that has stopped me from using encryption, however, is the lack of compadibility for diffrent operating systems.
If I encrypt the drive using AES-256 on linux, I'm unable to read it on Windows. If I encrypt it with one of the Windows tools, I'm unable to read it on linux.
So I'm stuck between only being able to read my information at home on my linux machine, or only on public/windows
Re:Cooperation between Linux and Windows? (Score:2, Informative)
http://truecrypt.sf.net/ [sf.net]
Re:Cooperation between Linux and Windows? (Score:2, Informative)
Re:Cooperation between Linux and Windows? (Score:2)
Re:Cooperation between Linux and Windows? (Score:2)
As I have said elsewhere in this thread, there's a natural conflict between pivacy and integrity of data. Any redundancy built-in to the encrypted contaner would weaken privacy by making cryptanalysis somewhat easier. (Possibly much easier.) If you need to bother with encryption in the f
Re:Cooperation between Linux and Windows? (Score:2)
Re:Cooperation between Linux and Windows? (Score:2)
Of course. Just encrypt each file separately. Obviously that's not very convenient, but if that's what you want an encrypted container is probably not the right solution for you.
Maybe you need to use a lot of small containers that each hold a few files, so the damage caused by container loss is never excessive. (For some value of excessive.) If you
Re:Cooperation between Linux and Windows? (Score:2)
So let me just say that you are of course correct, but there seems to be a misunderstanding about what I was trying to say.
Re:Cooperation between Linux and Windows? (Score:2)
I'm assuming that you're talking about things like passwords, bank accounts, or other textual information.
My solution is low-tech. I have a GPG/PGP key with a decent length passphrase (and a 2-year expiration date). The private keys and the passphrase get kept in the safe-deposit box downtown as a backup. (Key management is generally the "hard" part and usually where things get screwed up.)
For ever
Re:Cooperation between Linux and Windows? (Score:2)
If you're decrypting your data at public computers, the whole encryption thing is essentially pointless. You don't know what's on that computer that could be snooping your passphrase and copying plaintext from ram.
Key Management (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:Key Management (Score:2)
So keep your private key on a smart card (I use an OpenPGP card from Kernel Concepts). All the encryption/decryption takes place on the card, which requires a passphrase to use. If you type the passphrase wrong a certain number of times, the card melts itself, destroying the key.
This gives you all the convenience of a short password, with all the secur
HIPAA (Score:2)
Habit (Score:2)
So, I think just the paranoia of having files being much more "destructible" has kept me from encrypting my hard drive on my laptop.
On the other hand, now I use OS X and Linux, and have multiple
easu encryption (Score:2)
Making the disks encrypted is even easier than making
Full disk encryption unavailable to some of us (Score:2)
Because I use a Mac. As do at least half of my laptop-wielding coworkers.
Once a stable solution exists, I will be all over it, but at this rate I'll likely have to write it myself.
Re:Full disk encryption unavailable to some of us (Score:2)
Encryption is certainly available for your Mac, with one click of a checkbox in the Security Pref Pane. Or are you just saying FileVault is too unstable, or do you want more than the /Users directories encrypted?
In addition, you can create sparse encrypted disk images in OS X using Disk Utility, so while I don't believe you can encrypt your ENTIRE disk, you certainly can encrypt the parts that matter, I think.
There's no benefit to encryption until... (Score:2)
I've recently been part of a outsourced payroll provider transition. As the IT guy for the customer end, I've been telling our folks to put a password on sensitive Excel* files (full of SIN's and other stuff like that) that get emai
Re:There's no benefit to encryption until... (Score:2)
Microsoft's EFS is NOT an option. (Score:2)
EFS is very poorly documented. Limits & failur (Score:2)
Scaling & key management (Score:2)
1. it doesn't scale - all the various products today can be used for small deployments and still be useable. However, try to scale it to a large enterprise with thousands of machines and you have an administration headache. Microsoft EFS has various flaws in it like this. For instance, if somehow a user's _local_ profile on the machine with the encrypted data is erased, all his data is gone or has to be recovered by the backup operator (
Re:Scaling & key management (Score:2)
EFS will store your machine local keys (encrypted) in a file there (I don't remember if it has its own files or stores them in the profile registry files).
If that directory is nuked (My Computer->Properties->Advanced->User Profiles Settings->Delete for instance), the user's keys are gone and his access to his data is gone.
EFS relies on storing the user's keys in the pro
Re:decent key management (Score:2)
Re:Biggest problem I ran into? Money... (Score:2)
600k for 7500 laptops isn't that bad assuming USD. 80/laptop, 16/year after that.
How much do you spend on crappy AV software for those 7500 laptops?