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Microsoft Research Warn About VM-Based Rootkits 336

Tenacious Hack writes "According to a story on eWeek, lab rats at Microsoft Research and the University of Michigan have teamed up to create prototypes for virtual machine-based rootkits that significantly push the envelope for hiding malware and maintaining control of a target OS. The proof-of-concept rootkit, called SubVirt, exploits known security flaws and drops a VMM (virtual machine monitor) underneath a Windows or Linux installation. Once the target operating system is hoisted into a virtual machine, the rootkit becomes impossible to detect because its state cannot be accessed by security software running in the target system."
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Microsoft Research Warn About VM-Based Rootkits

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  • by Saven Marek ( 739395 ) on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:02PM (#14895990)
    Why is microsoft researching this kind of thing? And with Linux too? It makes me wonder if the next time you go to install Windows on a partition somewhere with the same machine as you also dual boot into Linux whether your linux boot will not then be "taken over" by Windows, and MS can insert any little hooks, DRM, inspection code or other things running underneath the linux system you have.

    Then they can force linux to perform worse than Windows and nobody will be none the wiser.

    Except when you boot into linux and then you get a blue screen it will give it away lol.
  • Of Course (Score:3, Insightful)

    by Alien54 ( 180860 ) on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:03PM (#14895998) Journal
    while I can appreciate the logic of the research, I imagine this only gives creedance to the theories that companies deliberately design viruses so that they can sell more of their latest security product. or system/OS upgrade
  • by petermgreen ( 876956 ) <plugwash.p10link@net> on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:04PM (#14896000) Homepage
    that virtualising i386 was hard and carried quite some overhead.

    i'd imagine the vm would have quite different performance patterns for some operations than the real machine. it would also pretty much by definition have to have slightly less ram.
  • translation (Score:5, Insightful)

    by Anonymous Coward on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:09PM (#14896026)
    You can only be secure if your run hardware with treacherous computing modules installed on the motherboard and in the "approved" CPUs and BIOS chips, and that only works with treacherous computing software, sort of expensive hand in designer glove..

    Kind of a sneaky advertisement, isn't it? Instill terror to sell vendor lockin hardware and operating systems. Maybe even get a law or three passed. They sort of gloss over the "get the rootkit there in the first place" part, don't they?
  • by nurb432 ( 527695 ) on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:12PM (#14896037) Homepage Journal
    On a normal machine, if you try to virtualize it you would notice right away that something was wrong as it would slow quite a bit.

    There might also be driver issues that could tip you off something isnt right. May not know what, but it should be apparent something is amis. It would have to emuate all the hardware that you had installed at the time of infection, unlike something like VMWare which presents a 'standard' ( but different ) set of hardware devices. Thats a prety tall order to pull off.
  • by TheWanderingHermit ( 513872 ) on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:12PM (#14896038)
    That was my first thought: why is MS researching this? Pure research like this and MS just do not go together.

    Honestly, this sounds like the kind of thing they'll think of so they can use it as a reason that all computers should have DRM build into the chipset, which plays right into MS being able to justify why all systems should follow their boot rules that allow only Vista to run. It's just laying the groundwork to force the exclusion of anything but Vista being able to be booted on future systems.

    This is also the kind of thing that I don't think many black hats would have come up with on their own due to the amount of research. MS continaully says it is irresponsible for people to publish info on exploits in Winodws before they can patch them, yet they've just gone and published what could be one of the nastiest exploits of any OS to date. If they're doing this, it's for a reason, and experience tells us MS's reasons are good for them and bad for everyone else.
  • by Anonymous Coward on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:14PM (#14896044)
    They are researching it so they can scare people into thinking that Trusted Computing is required for their own protection. If the rootkit loads before the OS, that just leaves the BIOS to do your security checks, right?
  • by Beardo the Bearded ( 321478 ) on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:16PM (#14896056)
    You don't have to drain the battery - you can disconnect it.

    Your virtual machine could flash your BIOS without your consent. Then you're boned. A bootstrap doesn't require a lot of space.

    Oh fuck me - the next step is a VM rootkit that flashes the bios to keep a VM rootkit.
  • Virtually. (Score:2, Insightful)

    by Roskolnikov ( 68772 ) on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:18PM (#14896071)
    My experience with Windows and VM scenarios is that it runs better in VM then in real life; mom and pop might not notice this but I should hope those that are savvy enough to understand what Microsoft is proposing as a 'threat' would also be savvy enough to notice the little things that make VM still a pain.
    examples:

    I bought 4 GB of ram and a 400 GB drive, now I have 1 GB and 150 GB drive (with 250 GB overhead for mail and porn).
    My Ultra-Monkey quad SLI Nvidia 9999 video card with 1 GB of ram now shows up as a 16 MB S3 Virge card, WTF?
    My Comcastic experience is now more like my old netcom dial up account but the cable modems lights are busy.

    Its really good to see Microsoft concerned about security, but I hope they will stop looking at how elaborate the hacks could be and focus more on why this crap
    can be done in the first place.....

  • Re:rootkits? (Score:3, Insightful)

    by Dionysus ( 12737 ) on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:29PM (#14896107) Homepage
    Under those conditions, couldn't one just have a program that creates a checksum of the bootblock on install and checks it regularly? Then you can do an md5 on that program from time to time to make sure it's okay.

    Where do you put the checksum? On an external hd? On the system? What's preventing the rootkit from replacing the checksum? A checksum of the checksum? If you don't allow the checksum to be replaced, how do you upgrade?
  • Holy Crap! (Score:3, Insightful)

    by PhunkySchtuff ( 208108 ) <kai&automatica,com,au> on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:31PM (#14896115) Homepage
    Why on earth is someone writing this software for the purposes of malware - why aren't they gainfully employed earning decent money.
    Seriously, whipping up your own VM that will run $HOST_OS is nowhere near in the same league as, say, hacking together a VBS macro in MS Word or similar...
  • by 0racle ( 667029 ) on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:37PM (#14896133)
    Why? Because everyone knows virtualization is going to become very common place almost everywhere you have a datacenter. They also know that every time you change something you open the possibility of exploits. By knowing how exploits could be introduced into systems using virtualization they can begin to look at how to combat it. Why look at Linux as well? I seem to remember MS buying some virtualization software that supports Linux guests. They also know about VMWare on Linux hosts running Windows guests, which is a supported configuration.

    Not everything is a conspiracy. In fact, very few things are.
  • by Saven Marek ( 739395 ) on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:42PM (#14896155)
    Mabey they also have better things to do than write tripe accusing the open source community of being part of these malware authors by saying things like "Virtual-machine monitors are available from both the open-source community..." specifically listing open source as part of the problem.

    They might have better things to do than that, but it doesn't mean it will stop them doing it. No windows nearmy boxen thank you.

    > Besides, you should know how to audit your init scripts and copy your boot sector to a file you can check the md5 of at
    > boot. If you dont know how, its your fault.

    Always blame the user. mabey you will have someone break into your house and then they use the excuse "You should know how to stop me getting into your house. If you don't know how its your fault". So blame the victim and let MS off scott free? That's the attitude that let them off with no monopoly punishment. Just remember not to call the police next time.

  • by diablomonic ( 754193 ) on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:46PM (#14896176)
    how will a networked virus scanner help? its still getting the system info from the OS on the compromised system, and the OS on the compromised system does not know its compromised because the VM is UNDERNEATH it, and therefore tries to act for all intents and purposes as if it's not there!!!.

    With a perfect bug free VM, neglecting slight performance differences that may or may not be detectable, you pretty much have to scan the compromised hard drive by pluggin it into another pc (as unbootable of course) running a clean os to detect it (or at least thats my understanding which could be wrong :) )

  • Just one problem: (Score:5, Insightful)

    by guruevi ( 827432 ) on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:47PM (#14896181)
    How do you install the rootkit? Yes, you guessed it, through an insecure operating system. This article is imho just another promotion FUD campaign for TCPA.

    If your current operating system and security measures are good enough, such rootkits-with-virtual-machines are not even going to be able to be installed, heck as long as you don't have to login as administrator to print out a document or surf the web, you're pretty safe.

    And as soon as you notice your box could be r00t3d, you take it out anyway and don't trust it. And if you don't notice one of your boxes is generating extra traffic or doing things it shouldn't, you shouldn't have to have admin privileges anyway.
  • by TubeSteak ( 669689 ) on Friday March 10, 2006 @10:51PM (#14896198) Journal
    > However, VMBRs have a number of disadvantages compared to traditional forms of malware. When compared to traditional forms of malware, VMBRs tend to have more state, be more difficult to install, require a reboot before they can run,
    How is that a disadvantage?

    If the bastards already have enough access to be downloading and executing code on your machine, it is trivial for them to crash your box and make you reboot... assuming they can't just reboot your box out of hand.

    Notice how one of their solutions is secure hardware?
    I think we know why MS is funding this.
  • by Courageous ( 228506 ) on Friday March 10, 2006 @11:00PM (#14896223)
    Oh fuck me - the next step is a VM rootkit that flashes the bios to keep a VM rootkit.

    Flashes your bios, writes your boot blocks, patches your microcode, wash, rinse, repeat, all that's left to do is nuke it from orbit, as the other guy said....

    C//
  • by radtea ( 464814 ) on Friday March 10, 2006 @11:04PM (#14896238)
    Can you think of a way to win against rootkits without TCPA?

    Almost trivially.

    The whole point of TCPA is that "trust" is built in to the machine in a fundamentally inaccessbile (to the user) way.

    What is needed to defeat rootkits is to allow the user to trust the hardware. This is totally different from application vendors trusting the hardware.

    Here's an extreme example: hook a logic analyzer up to the BIOS. Look at the nice bits go by. See if they match expectations. If not, you've been rooted and had your BIOS flashed. "Expectations" are stored in a separate device.

    The issue here is strictly one of treating a computer as a fully self-contained block of hardware and software that no one is allowed or able to look inside without going through the terribly civilized interfaces. The solution is to say, "Fuck the fucking interfaces, I'm going to fucking look at what is on the fucking bus." Not civilized at all.

    I've debugged embedded code this way, by hooking a logic analyzer up to the hardware and watching the bits go by. It's educational. It would be simple to build this kind of exposure of hardware internals in to the motherboard, to make it easy to plug in an external integrity checker to ensure that the basic state of the machine is as expected.

    "Trusted" computing is all about hiding the hardware state from the user. Beating VM-based rootkits is all about exposing hardware state to the user. The two are diametrically opposed.
  • by this great guy ( 922511 ) on Friday March 10, 2006 @11:06PM (#14896242)
    <<
    If theres anything sophisticated enough to bypass this level of paranoia then it can damn well have my credit card number and I'll gladly send spam for them.
    >>

    This may very well astonish you, but such sophisticated infection mechanisms already exist and have already been demonstrated. See this rootkit concept overwriting your BIOS [ngssoftware.com] to create a permanent backdoor.

    Note: removing the CMOS battery will not destroy this rootkit because the CMOS battery erases the NVRAM, not the BIOS flash chip. The only known way to recover from a BIOS rootkit is to reflash your BIOS... but what if the rootkit is intelligent and tries to re-corrupt the new image being flashed ? This is a possibility. In this case your only option is to physically change the flash chip with a known good one. And don't forget that a modern computer has a lot of flash chips that can theoretically be infected: hard disk firmware, video card BIOS, DVD drive firmware, etc.

  • That was my first thought: why is MS researching this?

    "Genuine Advantage for Vista" seems one possible application. So, what were we saying about the "Signs of the end times"?

  • by arrrrg ( 902404 ) on Saturday March 11, 2006 @12:35AM (#14896522)
    Pure research like this and MS just do not go together.

    Ummmm ... I'm as fanatical as the next /.er, but come on. Microsoft has plenty of legitimate theoretical research projects going on, just look at research.microsoft.com [microsoft.com]. And an issue like this one is obviously relevant to them, if they want to get their act together and improve security (or at least the appearence thereof).
  • by quentin_quayle ( 868719 ) <{quentin_quayle} {at} {yahoo.com}> on Saturday March 11, 2006 @12:48AM (#14896572)
    GP: "The whole point of TCPA is that 'trust is built in to the machine in a fundamentally inaccessbile (to the user) way."

    Parent "You don't know anything about TCPA. The whole point is to do a 'trusted boot' so that the state of the machine can be known and reported in an unforgeable way. This allows both users and remote parties to know that the machine is running a certain configuration, with no rootkits or malware installed."

    No, you're the one who doesn't understand TC. When you boot a computer that complies with the whole TC spec, you have no idea what it's running because you can't trust the software that purports to tell you about it.

    To boot into trusted mode, you have to be running signed binaries provided by the holders of the attestation key. They may claim to give you source but you can't verify that it's the source of what's running because you can't compile it and replace the signed binary and then get into "trusted" mode.

    Therefore you have no idea what the software is doing, no control over what it does, and no way to verify whether it's telling you the truth about anything. It's true that "the state of the machine can be known and reported in an unforgeable way", but the claim that "This allows both users and remote parties to know that the machine is running a certain configuration" is your lie. Only to the key holders is the state known. Non-key-holders including the owner of the hardware are shut out of this knowledge and from control of the machine.

    You're either ignorant or a corporate shill. Your phrase "with no rootkits or malware installed" invokes the "big lie" of so-called "trusted computing", the idea that it protects "security" for the owner of the hardware. In fact it abolishes the possibilty of security for the owner of the hardware. TC itself is the ultimate trojan for the reasons explained here.
  • by afidel ( 530433 ) on Saturday March 11, 2006 @02:41AM (#14896902)
    Duh, it's a propaganda piece for Trusted Computing Platform. If they want a way to convince people to lock themselves out of their own system through software-hardware integration what better boogyman then a super-duper undetectable spyware. Obviously the spyware wouldn't be able to install a boot loader if it didn't have an authentication key and the hardware required such a key to boot...
  • by Anonymous Coward on Saturday March 11, 2006 @05:13AM (#14897198)
    Malware is that which subverts the users control of a system for the benefit of a third party making TCPA by definition, a preinstalled hardware rootkit.
  • by chris_7d0h ( 216090 ) on Saturday March 11, 2006 @06:37AM (#14897389) Journal
    A thought just crossed my mind.
    Since admins running Unix-like systems mostly operate as non-root users, wouldn't it then be possible for a malware to lurk in the background of the non-privileged sandbox until you sudo/su and then for it to use the newly gained privileges to wreak havoc/gather intel and hide itself? In a non-root sandbox the malware process would likely show up in the process list, but who can honestly say that they check the process list each time before they become root? Also, a malware naming itself like a common process (or the same as a process which already occupies the list) like bash for example, would make a casual glance likely to disregard that listed entry.

    Disclaimer: I don't pretend to know the intrisinct details regarding privilege escalation in *nix, so this thought might well be nothing but nonsense.
  • by Kristoffer Lunden ( 800757 ) on Saturday March 11, 2006 @04:04PM (#14899222) Homepage
    Not to mention that this series is among the best books I've ever read, if not *the* best. People may call it perverted if they want, but then they focus on the actions committed and not what lies behind them - Donaldson is really good at describing people who are doing things out of their own personal - and believable - motives, what drives them. Often with bad or even catastrophic results because they were misinformed or misdirected. This is true for his other books as well, especially the Covenant series are great too.

    The Gap is also interesting because it's based on The Ring of the Nibelung (I think) and explores the concept of obtaining and losing absolute power (with omni-corporation instead of omni-being) and the exploration of victim/villain/rescuer and how they trade roles with each other during the story. All in all it's a fantastic story.
  • by Stephen Samuel ( 106962 ) <samuel@NOsPaM.bcgreen.com> on Saturday March 11, 2006 @04:10PM (#14899244) Homepage Journal
    If the rootkit is sophisticated enough to infect the BIOS, what keeps it from flashing the HDD firmware as well?

    Well, if you take a suspect disk, put it in a clean machine and then boot from the suspect disk then you're not just boned.... you're too stupid to be an investigator.

  • by Tyger ( 126248 ) on Saturday March 11, 2006 @07:56PM (#14900159)
    Because software has bugs, and BIOS is software just like anything else. BIOS contains the CPU microcode which comes out with updates sometimes. (Microcode isn't flashed like BIOS is... A microcode update has to be loaded every poweron.)

    Support for new CPUs that didn't exist but are perfectly compatible with the chipset.

    The BIOS does more than just load the OS. It sets up the chipset as well. Some of it in ways that the OS can't do anything about easily. There are a number of settings in the chipset and CPU that require a reset to take effect, so your computer likely resets a couple times before you even see the BIOS screen.

    All of this has to be done by the BIOS, and if theres a bug in any of it, you need to update the BIOS.
  • by farble1670 ( 803356 ) on Sunday March 12, 2006 @01:57AM (#14901195)
    "MS continaully says it is irresponsible for people to publish info on exploits in Winodws before they can patch them, yet they've just gone and published what could be one of the nastiest exploits of any OS to date. If they're doing this, it's for a reason, and experience tells us MS's reasons are good for them and bad for everyone else."

    please, be fair. first, it's not like MS released a rootkit. they just did a proof of concept internally. second, it's sound engineering to figure out how a system can be exploited before it actually is. that allows you to prevent the problem before it occurs in a malicous context.

    if MS had kept this to themself, then there'd be a story here about how MS is keeping known security flaws private. i've seen that exact same criticism of cisco systems on here before.

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