Maryland Votes To Ban Diebold Voting Machines

vandon writes "Computerworld.com reports: 'The state Maryland House of Delegates this week voted 137-0 to approve a bill prohibiting election officials from using AccuVote-TSx touch-screen systems in 2006 primary and general elections. The legislation calls for the state to lease paper-based optical-scan systems for this year's votes. State Delegate Anne Healey estimated the leasing cost at $12.5 million to $16 million for the two elections.'"

Re:The old fashioned ways are still the best

[kenf]

How about using the computer to mark the paper ballot? Use a touch screen computer, similar to the Diebold setup to allow the voter to vote. Then the machine prints out a human readable, but scanable ballot that the voter checks, and deposits in a ballot box. You can use the scanner to count votes, and humans can also count them if needed.

Ken

Re:Hope it doesn't rain....

[markdj]

You, the voter, don't get to keep the receipt. What happens is that you get to see is whether the machine voted for you as you wanted, and then that receipt is kept by election officials to act as backup in case the electronic count fails in some way. Then the receipts are used to recount the election. Because you can't read the machine directly with your eyes, if there is any question as to the tally produced by the machine, the paper receipts can be used to recount. Yes, there has always been fraud, and paper can be compromised, but that doesn't mean that we shouldn't be doing better when adopting new methods and better procedures for securing the ballots. The idea that the tally is correct because the machine says so is a myth: "It must be right because the computer says so!" Diebold has consistently denied that their computers could fail and that a backup method for recounts was needed.

Re:Hope it doesn't rain....

[dotslashdot]

Yes, what could possibly go wrong with computer voting? http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/8/114.htm l [bbvforums.org] Your example is ridiculous. The problem with computer voting using a closed-source voting software program whose data is easily manipulated without leaving any trace is that anyone can more easily alter votes without detection. The fact that it rained on some SAT scores is irrelevant because it doesn't address the issue of manipulating votes. Surely you understand that someone can easily change the outcome of an election by changing a massive number of votes without leaving a trace? Sure, accidents happen, but adding this unprotected, unaudited code in the mix makes manipulating votes easier, not harder, which is troublesome, given Diebold's connections to the Republican party. http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=03/09/0 4/159216 [democracynow.org]

Re:Oops...

[Tmack]

I wonder who audits where the wires really go

If its anything like the one in the Ga House, they go up to a giant light board with the Rep's name, where it turns on either a Red or Green light next to the name, and tallys all the lights of the same color to give a play-by-play of the votes. If the tally is incorrect, its plainly visible. Im sure a rep would complain if their vote shows up incorrectly on the big board with their name next to it...

tm

I didn't see any reason for the upgrade anyway...

[jo7hs2]

As a Maryland voter, I was confused as to why we went to touchscreen voting anyway! We had a relatively new optical system (I called him R2D2 because of the size ans shape of the device that ate your ballot) that worked great, and was relatively fool-proof, I mean, it was a huge sheet of paper with big holes. We replaced that simplistic approach where dozens could vote simultaneously with dozens of little computers, of which only two or three were "allowed for use" at any given time, to conserve battery power. Needless to say, the systems were less than fool-proof as well. For once, this GOP'r actually is pleased with the Democratically controlled Maryland legislature.

Too bad Accupoll went bankrupt

[NevDull]

A Texas company called Accupoll had an electronic voting device which provided a VVPAT (Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail), which was approved in several municipalities, and was certified HAVA (Help Americans Vote Act) compliant.

Too bad "On January 30, 2006, AccuPoll filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Pursuant to this filing, AccuPoll will cease operations and liquidate its assets. Therefore, AccuPoll voting systems are no longer available for purchase."

Halle-frickin-lujah

[Conspiracy_Of_Doves]

As a Marylander, I am SO happy they they are getting rid of those damn things.

The dumb thing is that the system that we had before wasn't even confusing at all. Each candidate's name had a arrow with a gap in it. You simply used a pencil to complete the arrow for the candidate you wanted to vote for.

You just turn this:

- ->

into this

--->

No one was even complaining about it.

I assume that they just wanted to jump on the electronic voting bandwagon, no matter how much the entire IT community railed against the machines.

Re:Oops...

[daveo0331]

Their voting isn't secret ballot. If someone was messing around with the wires, it would get noticed, probably by the representative whose vote was counted incorrectly (or their staff/party/lobbyists/constituents/local newspaper).

Re:Taking it on the chin

[zippthorne]

IIRC, they offered models that had a paper trail, but for whatever reason those models cost more than the non-paper trail models. Many counties opted for the cheaper models for whatever reason.

My guess is that they assumed or were told that the electronic machines would allow them to go "paperless" as in "paperless office" and they failed to consider the ramifications wrt. voting

Re:Hope it doesn't rain....

[jmcharry]

North Carolina has gone a bit further and now requires a percentage of random hand recounts to verify the system is working correctly. This provides a check on not just the voting machines, but on the tabulating equipment, which could also be tampered with.

miller2006.org -- miller2006.net

[Anonymous Coward]

Oops, the little scumbag moved to
http://action.miller2006.net/miller2006/homepage.h tml [miller2006.net]

sorry

Re:Thank God

[French Mailman]

The problem with that idea is that it requires the system to log who votes for whom, which goes against the principle of anonymous voting.

Re:The old fashioned ways are still the best

[cdrguru]

Unfortunately, while it might be nice to think about just paper ballots, there are expectations in the US that make it almost impossible to continue using them.

First, is the accessability issue. You have voters that can't understand instructions and can't follow them when they are explained. A paper ballot that isn't verified for correctness immediately results in the "undervote" and "overvote" situation where they have either not enough marks or too many marks to figure out what the voter intended. Unless someone or something checks the ballots immediately, this will be a problem.

The next problem is also related to accessability. We are faced with a situation where volunteering to work in a polling place is almost unheard of. So, they go to the Senior Citizens Center and recruit people from there. You would think that people would do anything to get out and do something different - not in the US. They struggle to get the minimum number of people that are legally required for the county and have to live with that.

This means there are no "extra" helpers for people that can't read the paper or can't see the writing there. Or need some other kind of assistance. So any mechanical aid that can work with Braille or whatever else is required (writing 3x the size, etc.) is a requirement. If the machine can talk to them, even better.

The last requirement is that if the legal and accurate results of voting are not available five minutes after the polls close, the news programs will just make stuff up. They will rely on exit polls or talking with party spokespersons to find out what the results might be.

The idea that the voting results could wait for three days (or even a couple of weeks) after voting has completed is utterly unacceptable to the news media. They need results in minutes and they will do whatever it takes to get results to people. Accurate or not, it doesn't matter. Speed is the only thing that counts.

This obsession with feeding results to people has seriously hurt us in the past and most recently in 2000. Announcing the winner of an election or even that a candidate is ahead or behind while the polls are still open should be a crime. It isn't today.

Therefore, we are left with "imaginary results" if the real vote count doesn't come along fast enough. Can you imaging the chaos if the TV news programs announced a winner and three days later when the official count was done - not just the exit polls - it was some other candidate?

Face it, immediate tabulation of vote results is a requirement. We are going to have results at 7:01 PM if the polls close at 7:00 PM, one way or another. And we are going to have "accessible" voting that does not require helpers, because there are no "helpers" - nobody wants to volunteer. We are going to have immediately verified ballots, because to do otherwise results in Florida in 2000 all over again.

The one thing we are not going to have, at any point in the foreseeable future, is nationwide consistency in voting. It will be state-by-state and county-by-county until the end of "State's Rights". Not likely to happen any time soon, because it would require people to give up power they have in public offices. Ever heard of a politician doing that?

Re:Oops...

[HUADPE]

If its anything like the one in the Ga House, they go up to a giant light board with the Rep's name, where it turns on either a Red or Green light next to the name, and tallys all the lights

It is a fairly similar system, with a blue backlit board [wikipedia.org] above the speaker's chair, and members using ID cards to vote. After the 15 minutes of a normal vote expire however, members have to use the old system of handing in a green (yea), red (nay), or orange (present) card.

Mod this parent up.

[tinrobot]

This is hardly a troll.

Optical scanner machines are a huge part of the problem, as is the central tabulator these scanners feed. They both are wide open for hacking and vote fixing.

Here's an article on how the optical scan machines can be hacked:

http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0505/S00381.htm [scoop.co.nz]

California Uber Alles

[Doc Ruby]

Steven Heller, the guy blowing the whistle on Diebold's voterigging crimes is now being persecuted in court with felony charges. Aphor's diary has details of his legal defense [slashdot.org]. Including an easy way to do something about it: donate a little money to protect his rights, and your right to vote freely.

Re:The old fashioned ways are still the best

[alexburke]

First, is the accessability issue. You have voters that can't understand instructions and can't follow them when they are explained. A paper ballot that isn't verified for correctness immediately results in the "undervote" and "overvote" situation where they have either not enough marks or too many marks to figure out what the voter intended. Unless someone or something checks the ballots immediately, this will be a problem.

When I voted in a Toronto municipal election (2000?), the ballot was a letter-size sheet. I was handed a Sharpie and told to connect the arrow-head next to my choice with its arrow-tail about 1 cm to the right, then slipped it into a cardboard carrier that covered the lower 3/4 of the ballot (no selections were made in the top quarter, so it was completely secret). I handed it to the lady, who turned it so the ballot was about to enter the machine head-first and face-down, and brought the carrier closer so the top of the sheet entered the unit. It sucked the ballot from the carrier, scanning it, and dropped it into a sealed cardboard box for later counting if necessary (or maybe they were all counted anyway just in case).

Anyway, you mention that it should be able to immediately report errors -- this machine did. I watched a little old lady's ballot get about 95% of the way into the machine, and then heard it start beeping and reverse its feed rollers, spitting the ballot back out face-down. Apparently she didn't completely connect the two parts of the arrow.

These machines had modems in them, which after the polls closed were connected to a phone line to report the numbers to the mothership. The ballots were still stored in their sealed cardboard box.

As mentioned elsewhere, for the disabled/infirm/etc a touchscreen system could be used to print such ballots which were ready to scan, sans Sharpie.

Why on earth isn't this system used EVERYWHERE? It really *is* the perfect system! Simple ballots (big text, and the arrows were at least an inch apart vertically, with the candidates in a column), no hanging chads, instant electronic results, and Real Paper Ballots to fall back on.