JavaRob's Journal: Embryonic Rights, part IV

One of these days I'm going to set up a blog where I can have indefinite exchanges; in the meantime, I had to get started on a new project, and comments were archived, so here's the next continuation.

I'll just quote the comments I'm responding to in bold (seems simpler than recreating those posts).

Cheers!
Rob

The metaphysical

[JavaRob]

From this thread:
http://slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=176610&thresho ld=0&commentsort=0&mode=thread&cid=14703027 [slashdot.org]

The idea of anything being "inherent" is a big claim to begin with -- how does that correlate with the physical world?

Well, it doesn't correlate, actually. Inherency is a metaphysical concept. All moral claims are metaphysical. Even empiricism itself is metaphysical. So is the validity of your reality test -- can you prove that our ethical principles should correlate to the physical

Re:The metaphysical

[cagle_.25]

It's interesting ... I just made the first pass through an article given to me by a student concerning this very idea: that the acquisition of moral concepts shares a strong parallel with the acquisition of language in children.

In both cases, however, the author appears to take a contrary view from you; namely, that children are hard-wired to receive both language and morality.

I will need to re-read the article more carefully before I give more detail, and I left it at school over the weekend. So more to c

Re:The metaphysical

[JavaRob]

In both cases, however, the author appears to take a contrary view from you; namely, that children are hard-wired to receive both language and morality.

I will need to re-read the article more carefully before I give more detail[...]

You might want to also reread my post before you argue that this contradicts my viewpoint. :)

From the post you're responding to: Take the model that each of us individually claims various rights, and individually agree to respect rights others claim, based on our own moral compas

Relativism

[JavaRob]

Responding to another part of this post:
http://slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=176610&thresho ld=0&commentsort=0&mode=thread&cid=14703027 [slashdot.org]

Well, yes, actually; people *do* have to be trained to listen to their moral compasses. Many, many people simply ignore them, and this leads to the bottomless nature of relativism. My overall sense at this point is that you would like to retain the flexibility of relativism while denying its bottomless nature, but perhaps I'm wrong.

I don't have much of a philo

Re:Relativism

[cagle_.25]

I'm going to probe a little more on some of these questions; I don't feel that I understand your model completely. I believe I understand the transaction between claiming and recognizing, but I'm still fuzzy on the differences between your language and mine. Also, I don't understand the third-party recognition of rights, since it doesn't fit exactly in the transaction model.

(1) What is the difference between "recognizing" and "granting"?
"Recognizing" as I was using it is more like agreeing with anothe

Models

[JavaRob]

I'm going to probe a little more on some of these questions; I don't feel that I understand your model completely.

I'm responding to your questions in another post, and can hopefully clarify the details.

At the moment, though, the big hole for me is the model you're building your assertions on (and that we're comparing mine to) -- you haven't really gone into any detail on it at all. I.e., exactly how are our moral decisions actually influenced towards the "correct" answer, and how do you explain the large c

Sources for unselfish behavior

[JavaRob]

You don't say this directly, but I think your main reason for rejecting my model is that you feel human beings would be purely self-interested, heartless animals if not for external supernatural guidance (however indirect).

I.e., generosity, feelings of caring for other humans and other creatures, empathy, etc. have no natural explanation and/or could not have evolved, so there must be an external, morally pure force influencing this behavior.

Is that accurate? If so, I can address that directly.

Re:Sources for unselfish behavior

[cagle_.25]

Not exactly. I can imagine an evolutionary framework in which self-sacrifice could be selected for by parents sacrificing for their children, for instance.

My concern with your model is that it undermines the possibility of discussion, not the possibility of people acting in accordance with their moral compasses.

I'm 'working' (thinking, right now) about my own model, but it will be a while (week +) before I can post it.

The article that I mentioned earlier is entitled "Moral Competence", by Susan Dwyer. Tan

Re:Sources for unselfish behavior

[JavaRob]

My concern with your model is that it undermines the possibility of discussion, not the possibility of people acting in accordance with their moral compasses.

Worth discussion, though quite a different issue than the accuracy of the model.

Actually, this is related to something I do grapple with. In this specific issue: are people better off believing that rights are inherent, even if that model isn't accurate? My general conclusion is no, though believing the inherency model may be closer to a practical tr

inherency continued

[JavaRob]

Earlier, you referred to a "reality test": the test I apply to philosophical constructions and assumptions is to compare them to reality, to what we can actually know or claim to know with any reasonable probability.

You then went on to describe, very nicely, the process by which one claims rights and another recognizes them. And, if I'm understanding you correctly, your claim is that the statements "I have right R" and "You have right R" *actually* mean "I claim the right R" and "I recognize your right R. P

Re:"recognize a claim" vs. "grant a right"

[JavaRob]

from this post:
http://slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=176610&cid=147 27331 [slashdot.org]

Here's where we run into the other part of reality: it doesn't seem to me that most people mean what you say they mean when they say "I have right R."

In your model, "I have the right R" and "You have the right R" are metaphors for "I claim the right R" and "I recognize the right R."

I need to be more precise. You're right, "I claim right R, please agree" is *not* what most people are thinking when they say "I have right R". Most peo

Re:"recognize a claim" vs. "grant a right"

[cagle_.25]

I still don't get this part -- how are they speaking nonsense? They are communicating effectively with others who *also* believe that rights are inherent.

Hmm...it seems clear enough. They might be sharing a common model with others who agree with that model, but the model itself is false (in your view). My students might tell me that objects stop unless pushed, and they might get widespread agreement in the class, but they are still wrong. If Bob claims right R, intending inherency, but rights aren't ac

Inherent rights model

[JavaRob]

From this post:
http://slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=176610&thresho ld=0&commentsort=0&mode=thread&cid=14662319 [slashdot.org]

I can't agree with the basic assumption that a right exists separate from us, that we can check on or point to.

Could you agree with the assumption that "rights exist separate from us, even though we cannot check on them; and we can only point to them in an imperfect fashion through conscience and consensus"? That is the spirit of (R).

I want to examine the inherency model for a moment.

Re:Inherent rights model

[cagle_.25]

Compare the alternative model of conscience (and built on that, human rights), built on instinct plus a big dose of social instruction and enforcement, etc. etc..

In which case, the blindness is parallel, and worse:

First, my moral compass is simply an outgrowth of evolution + culture. How am I to seek feedback within that framework? I can't predict the evolutionary outcome of my actions, and even if I could, there's nothing a priori morally correct about preserving my own species. There are plenty of ex