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Microsoft Downplaying Recent DNS Vulnerability

Posted by kdawson on Monday April 28, @10:06PM
from the it's-nothing-really dept.
Microsoft Watch writes "Microsoft downplays a recent DNS vulnerability in all Microsoft operating systems (XP, Vista, 2000, and 2003), claims Amit Klein, the security researcher who published the original vulnerability description (PDF) earlier this month. According to Klein, the description in Microsoft's Secure Windows Initiative blog entry is misleading, contains disinformation about the DNS transaction ID algorithm, and downplays the severity of the issue. Klein refutes Microsoft's claim that there is no way to reproduce the next transaction ID, given a series of observed transaction IDs. He shows that this is possible in his paper, which Microsoft had before publishing the SWI post, as well as on the series of data provided in the SWI blog itself."

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  • A swing and a miss! Seems pretty fitting in my eyes.
  • Unlikely, but... (Score:4, Interesting)

    by Kinky Bass Junk (880011) on Monday April 28, @10:11PM (#23233170)
    Is it possible that Microsoft was downplaying it to lessen the effects? E.g. reduce the amount of copy-cat attacks, etc.
    • by Uncle Focker (1277658) on Monday April 28, @10:26PM (#23233334)
      Or rather than spending all that effort in trying to downplay it, they could just fix the vulnerability and stop all the would-be attackers in their tracks. Nah, that would make too much sense.
    • I'd bet its partly that but more typical FUD. If they fix it too quickly it'll prove its true so they'll wait 3 months then sneak the fix into some bundle of other updates.

      We have SafeSurf types of plugins for FireFox and various toolbars like the one fro
    • by Divebus (860563) on Monday April 28, @11:50PM (#23234052)

      Is it possible that Microsoft was downplaying it to lessen the effects?
      Microsoft will certainly take security to the next level:
        "Are you sure you want to poison the DNS stub resolver cache? Allow or Deny."
      That'll fix it.
      • Considering it hits the public, I sincerely doubt that any coder would be allowed to publish security vulnerabilities. They would probably send a draft off to PR, who butters it up.
  • by v1 (525388) on Monday April 28, @10:14PM (#23233200) Homepage Journal
    Don't you just love it when they do that? Is there a strong enough term for those that go so completely out of their way to ignore facts and reality that it defies belief and leaves the sensible stunned? (reminds me of the Chewbacca Defense in a way)
    • Is there a strong enough term for those that go so completely out of their way to ignore facts and reality that it defies belief and leaves the sensible stunned?

      Yes. Paranoid schizophrenia.
    • Is "Republicans" or perhaps "Libertarians", the term you were looking for?

      I'm sorry, that was a low blow on my part, justified, but still low.

      Just so I don't get into oblivion as a troll, I will add something informative and on-topic. It appears that MSFT
  • two words (Score:3, Insightful)

    by FudRucker (866063) on Monday April 28, @10:21PM (#23233278)
    damage control.
      • by Anonymous Coward
        "gnutoo" is a sockpuppet of well-known troll twitter. He has already posted on this article with four [slashdot.org] different accounts. Please do not reward this type of behavior - the more karma an account has, the more trolling damage it can do.
  • by ThreeGigs (239452) on Monday April 28, @10:43PM (#23233484)
    Reading TFA and the details on the vulnerability, it seems to me that the attacker must first be able to sniff packets being sent to the DNS server from the desktop PC. This means the attacker apparently must have access to the network the desktop is on.

    Now, forgive me if I'm missing the obvious, but why would an attacker, *who can read an outgoing request to a DNS server in real time*, not simply craft a reply using the outgoing packet data as a model? Why bother figuring out the transaction ID when an attacker, according to the scenarios given, *should already have it*, having gotten it from the sniffed packet.

    I just don't see how being predictable makes this any worse, when you're apparently dealing with someone already on your own network, or on the route between you and your DNS server.
    • Re: (Score:2, Informative)

      by Anonymous Coward
      Why do you have to see requests from the same originating address? From the description it seems like you just inspect _any_ set of replies to _any_ requests, even ones you generate yourself, and you will be able to forge responses to any other requests,
      • by photon317 (208409) on Tuesday April 29, @12:04AM (#23234156)
        Precisely. If the transaction IDs are secure, then you have to play "man in the middle" to sniff the request and fake a response. But if you can guess the transaction IDs, you can blindly send a spoofed response from elsewhere on the net and fake out the user's DNS resolver. The details of doing this in practice can be tricky, but it's doable. That's why the dnsext working group has been trying to improve this aspect of the protocol. While MS's implementation has flaws that make it more predictable than it otherwise should be, the fundamental problem is with the decades-old DNS protocol to begin with. The transaction IDs are 16-bit numbers, which is very limiting if you need to generate secure sequences of them that can't be guessed. It's not too hard to just spam responses with random response IDs and get some small success rate with only 16 bits to play with.

        One of the current proposals (which I'm not a fan of because of other technical implications for DNS) is that since DNS query names are case-insensitive and copied by the server from the request packet to the response packet, to use the "uppercase bit" of each letter as more bits for the secure transaction ID. The fact that people are willing to consider hacks like these should tell you something about how badly we're backed into a corner on this issue with the DNS protocol. Hopefully soon someone will do something sensible like standardize an EDNS1 with extra transaction ID bits in the OPT RR, and then in like 10 years (if history is any guide) it might actually see wide deployment.
  • In light of the recent anti-MS bull that has got through to the slashdot frontpage, I for one am waiting till somebody at least attempts to read the article, before I condemn Microsoft entirely!

    So please reply with an analysis of the article so I can ignor
    • Dude, this is a technology forum. If you want politics or religion [groklaw.net] then go elsewhere. You see the slams on that company because not only can't it deliver, it goes through great acrobatics and effort to avoid delivering. Brand recognition cuts both ways,
  • Why is this news? (Score:5, Insightful)

    by IchBinEinPenguin (589252) on Monday April 28, @10:51PM (#23233562)
    $DUDE finds vulnerability in $PRODUCT made by $VENDOR.
    $DUDE claims this is really serious and should be fixed at once.
    (optional) $DUDE does the Right Thing and tells $VENDOR about it so they can fix it before he goes public.
    $VENDOR replies that $DUDE's claims are overblown.
    Flamewar on /., lots of page hits, lots of add revenue, PROFIT!!
    (optional, much later) $VENDOR quietly fixes $PRODUCT.
    • Actually it went like this, see the bold below

      $DUDE finds vulnerability in $PRODUCT made by $VENDOR.
      $DUDE claims this is really serious and should be fixed at once.
      (optional) $DUDE does the Right Thing and tells $VENDOR about it so they can fix it before h
  • RTFA (Score:5, Informative)

    by magamiako1 (1026318) on Monday April 28, @10:52PM (#23233578)
    Article Conclusion:

    April 30th, 2007 - Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) were informed of this issue.

    March 18th, 2008 - Microsoft releases a service pack for Windows Vista (Vista SP1), which includes a fix for this issue.

    April 8th, 2008 - Microsoft issues a fix ([19]) for Windows Vista, Windows XP SP2, Windows 2003 and Windows 2000 SP4. The fix is downloadable at Microsoftâ(TM)s website. Simultaneously, Trusteer discloses the vulnerability to the public (in the form of this document).

    Also, as stated above, the scenarios required to pull this off are pointless. If someone is sniffing your traffic in your switched network, they already have access to your network that could invoke far more problems than simple DNS poisoning.

    • Microsoft downplays security stuff.

      The "Desktop Linux" developers tend to downplay usability stuff ;). For example: Kmail closes an email you are working on, just because you decide to save while still working on it (so you have to save, reopen the draft).
      • Re: (Score:3, Insightful)

        Isn't it amazing how often stories about Microsoft's failings get hijacked by drones accusing everyone of being Twitter.

        You'd almost think Microsoft marketing wants tech-savvy people to discuss anything but their defective products and poor support.

      • I think that Microsoft has not been fixing security issues in Vista because, if they ever deliver a secure operating system, PC customers will never buy another.
        Yet they HAVE been fixing security issues. Maybe not fast enough, and maybe there are still outstanding issues, but to claim otherwise is wrong. Your belief is apparently that people ONLY upgrade for security fixes? I strongly disagree and would like to s