Real RFID Hacking Scenarios 180
kjh1 writes "Wired is running an article on RFID hacking that has potentially scary implications. Many RFID tags have no encryption and will happily transmit their information in the clear if they are active or within range of a reader. Worse yet is that they can be overwritten. Some interesting scenarios and experiments: snagging the code off of a security badge and replaying it to gain access to a secure building; vandalizing library contents by wiping or changing tags on books; changing the prices of items in a grocery or other store; and getting free gas by tweaking the ExxonMobil SpeedPass tags."
Regarding security badges (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:2)
Not that your general concern is entirely wrong, but this specific case isn't terribly strong. Better, maybe, is that a few of the
Overstated (Score:2)
No. It's not polite to slam doors in people's faces. But you could say "Sorry, I can't let you in" and just "close" the door. That guy might think you're a dick but the potential rape victims won't.
Re:Overstated (Score:2)
Re:Overstated (Score:2)
Here's the weird, counterintuitive bit: No. A predator would not grab a door and force hisher way in. Would draw attention (yours). So a person behaving rudely like this is almost certainly harmless.
'Course now that I've posted this theory on
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:2)
Why not integrate RFID tags into college IDs? Each dorm can then be locked to all except those who are actually in that dorm, but the building is locked to far fewer peop
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:2)
My college ID number was a letter + my social security number + 3 digits. I don't think I'd want its RFID chip broadcasting that number.
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:2)
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:4, Insightful)
Dorm security is a joke because for the most part it's not necessary. The people who break into dorms aren't sexual predators, they're common thieves trying to make off with a laptop or two. Most of the time they have legitimate access to the dorm anyway so the front door security is useless to begin with. Lock your door when you go to bed or leave the room, that's all there is to it.
I beg to differ (Score:2, Interesting)
Why do I know? BECAUSE I WAS THAT MAN. Not really. I lived there during that time, in 1995.
Re:I beg to differ (Score:2)
You also hear stories of college guys hiding out in the women's bathrooms to sneak a peek. That doesn't make them sexual predators either in my book.
On the other hand, the RFID systems implemented at colleges seems like a good method of detering pervets like these, at least until they overwrite a card with someone else's ID and get them in trouble.
the courts beg to differ (Score:2)
At 18 you should know better.
Re:the courts beg to differ (Score:2)
it's a tough call (Score:2)
He was complaining one night about the tests they make him take to determine rehabilitation and how they're rigged. He then went into how the questions were all subjective. Stuff like "when walking around at night do you look into people's windows" or soemsuch. They were really straightforward questions and he
Re:the courts beg to differ (Score:3, Informative)
dunno if you'll respond but (Score:2)
That'll teach me for picking a handle after reading Alternet.org on a friday night.
Re:I beg to differ (Score:2)
Re:I beg to differ (Score:4, Interesting)
Of course, the courts may think differently than you do.
We had a good example hereabouts (a suburb of Boston) a few years back, when there was a news story about a college student who'd had a few drinks on a Saturday night relieved himself in an alley. Unfortunately for him, he was spotted by a cop, arrested, charged with, and convicted of indecent exposure. It was pointed out in the news stories that now he'd have to register as a sex offender anywhere he ever lived again.
Among all the comments of the draconian nature of this, there were a few that pointed out another problem: To many of us who read the stories, the phrases "sex offender" and "sexual predator" now induce the thought "Probably another guy caught peeing in a dark alley."
Someone once observed that a problem with unjust laws is that they bring the entire legal system into disrespect. Some of the best examples are the extreme reactions to things like this.
Re:I beg to differ (Score:2)
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:2)
You cannot guarantee anything. YOu can only reduce the probability of it happenings.. but as you approach very high tolerance, the costs g
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:2)
The only problem with insecure RFID tags is that someone could potentially grab the info from your key without you knowing, and then using that info to gain access at a later time.
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:2)
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:2)
The irony of this statement, in the case of my alma mater, is that they prox card system was implemented largely out of fear of sexual predators. There were a few incidents where an unidentified male, not a student, was found lurking in a women's bathroom/shower in one of the dorms. Previously, all of the dorms were left unlocked during daylight hours duri
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:2, Funny)
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:5, Informative)
Ideall you authenticate on 2 out of these three:
1 - what you know
2 - what you have
3 - what you are (or aren't, depending).
Now that I think about it, most buildings I've been in that use RFID tags to open doors do not use anything but #2.
I found this gizmo at fidgets [phidgetsusa.com]just poking around on Google after reading TFA and feeling curious. That's the biggest one I found, the rest once stripped of their case would be very much like the scanner described in TFA.
I'm sure this will become a growing problem, quickly.
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:2)
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:2)
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:4, Interesting)
Huh?
I'm not sure I'm understanding what you're saying. Of course the keypad is digital. My keyboard is digital. Pretty much anything except for a mechanical combination lock is going to be "digital." (Well, even that you can argue is 'digital,' in the non-computerized sense of the term.)
Are you saying that the keypad appears on a screen, with the numbers in a random order in the array? E.g., so that some person might get a keypad numbered [[6,2,9][5,4,7][8,1,3]] and the next person would get [[3,8,4][5,2,1][6,9,7]]?
Seems like a system like that, which requires a touch-screen instead of a regular el-cheapo numeric keypad, would be pretty expensive to implement. If you have a small number of chokepoints where you can put them, it might work, but if you're trying to secure all the exterior doors of a large number of buildings, I could see it getting prohibitively expensive fast.
I have seen a lot of places that use Prox-Cards as their only form of authentication for access control: for whatever reason, people seem to think they're "more secure" than swipe cards. They were actually implemented at a place that I worked a few years ago this way, and I argued against them because of the RFID interception risk, but I got shot down by the PHB's and the system vendors, who said this was 'totally impossible.' I was tempted to try and figure out how to intercept the transmission, but I never had the time to get started.
At any rate, I don't work there anymore.
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:2)
That's how ours work here. Most of the time all our security keypads are dark. You use the RFID to light them up and randomize the number positions, then type in a 4-digit code.
In order to get in during off hours you must have MY badge and MY four digit code.
That said, during
Re:Regarding security badges (Score:2)
Encrypted RFID too expensive? (Score:5, Insightful)
A typical passive RFID chip costs about a quarter, whereas one with encryption capabilities runs about $5. It's just not cost-effective for your average office building to invest in secure chips.
Ok, office with 200 people. You mean to tell me a lousy thousand bucks isn't worth preventing an intrusion? Some places spend that much a month on copy paper.
I'd call it cost effective considering the alternetive possibilities
Re:Encrypted RFID too expensive? (Score:4, Insightful)
Re: (Score:2)
Re:Encrypted RFID too expensive? (Score:3, Insightful)
When you're talking about authentication tokens, this does absolutely ZERO to block a replay attack.
Re:Encrypted RFID too expensive? (Score:2)
The way most (insecure) RFID systems work is like this.
Reader: What is your key?
Card: My key is 123456.
Reader: (consults lookup table to see if that key is authorized)
Since the key is being transmitted in the clear, it's trivial for someone to snoop on the conversation and then repeat that key to the reader, and also open the door. This hap
Re:Encrypted RFID too expensive? (Score:2)
In theory anyway. IIRC, the weakness with the Mobil Speedpass was that with only a couple of challenges, the responses were captured and used to crack the private key. Not a big deal if all you can do with a cracked tag is buy some gas, but clearly not strong
Re:Encrypted RFID too expensive? (Score:2)
Think of the reader as simply being a network connection between one computer (the card in this case) and another (your desktop or whatever it is that is letting you in the door).
Re:Encrypted RFID too expensive? (Score:2)
Re:$1000 + Infrastructure + First Customer (Score:2)
It's the implementation of a contactless crypto card where it all goes to pieces.
Your -special- prox card is one card per building/office that's duplicated many times. No crypto, it just sends it's unique ID to the reader when powered. The reader is programmed to accept that card code.
Now, to add a little crypto to the system means perhaps the contactless card does a little computation, or decrypts a message sent from the reader to the card, then returns it to the r
Re:Encrypted RFID too expensive? (Score:2)
The cost of losing just one employee is far more than that, but some people fail to properly judge the risk of an event occurence when paying for safeguards to avoid it.
Stop your worrying! (Score:5, Funny)
Never fear, the DMCA is here to protect us from that sort of behavior. It's illegal, so I doubt criminals would even try it ;) Thanks god for big government!
http://religiousfreaks.com/ [religiousfreaks.com]With Every New Technology... (Score:3, Insightful)
Make has a project in the current issue (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Subscriber only (Score:3, Informative)
RFID Door [extremetech.com]
RFID board [phidgetsusa.com]
Instructions on building an extended range reader [iacr.org]
Needed: RFID lockers. (Score:5, Insightful)
I don't think many people carry thier credit cards out in the open.
Re:Needed: RFID lockers. (Score:2)
I don't know whether they use the encrypting chips or not, but my feeling is that they probably don't. Call me cynical, but I have a feeling that if an encrypting chip costs 2,000% more than a non-encrypting one, the credit card companies are probably go
Re:Needed: RFID lockers. (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:Needed: RFID lockers. (Score:2)
1) Sell the RFID chip for a nickel
2) Sell the shielding for $25
3) ???? (engineer a very public RFID scam)
4) Profit!
(Sigh. I never wanted to do that, but it seemed appropriate.)
Re:Needed: RFID lockers. (Score:2)
The real trick is getting everyone to standardize on the same device, so that you wouldn't have to carry a dozen of these things around.
Needed: RFID shredders (Score:2)
Re:Needed: RFID lockers. (Score:2)
Re:Needed: RFID lockers. (Score:2)
Re:Needed: RFID lockers. (Score:2)
Re:Needed: RFID lockers. (Score:2)
What got people is that i
Re:Needed: RFID lockers. (Score:2)
Re:Needed: RFID lockers. (Score:2)
Anyways, I'm thinking that simply covering the seams with duck tape would really do all that much good, as once the metallic tape fatigues and rips it is quite sharp and would just cut through the duck tape. I'll probably end up using duck for the seams and leaving a small space between the panels of metallic tape.
Oh, and for those about to flame me, the name is duck tape. Gray fabric tape was originally produced
Re:Needed: RFID lockers. (Score:2)
Re:Needed: RFID lockers. (Score:2)
RFID Spoofing Guide (Score:5, Informative)
Re:RFID Spoofing Guide (Score:3, Interesting)
He's right though that if you did a multilayer board that you could make the device a lot smaller; and I tend to wonder if you used an FPGA if you couldn't make it even smaller, down to around key-fob size. At any rate, he already seems to have achieved the "cigarette pack" size benchmark for a portable device, or close to it.
From his "Security Implications" section:
Nothing New (Score:5, Interesting)
They showed live examples and had very interesting stories about how they were reprogramming cheese to send RFID signals saying they were shavings products. Also, the store they were doing this in used RFID on all their products to make sure everything is shelved in the right place. They would reprogram an item on the shelf (already in the right place) to emit a signal saying it was something else. When the store came by to move the item to the correct place all they would find is the correct item. The presenters say it drove the store nuts.
Re:Nothing New (Score:2)
(more resources here [defcon.org] (and video!) -- just search for "smart-labels")
Speedpass IS encrypted... (Score:4, Informative)
Re:Speedpass IS encrypted... (Score:2)
A squirt of electrons??? (Score:3, Informative)
FUD (Score:2, Informative)
Re:FUD (Score:2)
Nope. I know many people who keep the badge in their wallet, and just bump the reader with their hip. Works fine. In the example given, the cloner did bump into the guy with the real badge.
"If I don't understand it, it must be secure." (Score:5, Insightful)
Another similar trap is "Any security technology I don't understand must be secure."
Everyone has some vague notion of how a traditional lock and key work, and how they might be circumvented.
But if there is no hole where the keyhole should be, and what IS there has some spiffy up-to-date appearance, and is "electronic" or "digital," the natural assumption is that because it clearly isn't a traditional lock and key, it must not have the traditional security vulnerabilities of a traditional lock and key... and since we aren't familiar with the new technology, we assume that "no traditional security vulnerabilities" = "no security vulnerabilities."
And, obviously, the vendor of the new system, who is likely to be in the best situation to know them, isn't likely to explain them to us.
Re:"If I don't understand it, it must be secure." (Score:2)
Like everything else there is a cost/security decision that has to be made. One could invest in a system that would use all three possibly keys (biometrics, passcode, key), or one could invest in a regular tumbler lock with 6 tumblers.
The reality is that of the population that wants to break into your office, most of them would be stopped by the lock - they don't want to break in badly enough to obtain a
Re:"If I don't understand it, it must be secure." (Score:2)
Another similar trap is "Any security technology I don't understand must be secure."
Here on slashdot the trap is different, though no less wrong. Slashdotters tend to think "Any technology I don't understand is probably insecure."
People just don't want to admit that "I don't know" is a valid answer.
Mod up the "FUD" factor of the headline (Score:3, Informative)
Read/Write tags are a step up in cost. They range from 20 bytes to 256 bytes of data with a 10 digit serial number. Some brands support encrypted encoding formats. There is a trivial one byte "access key code" that prevents a Writer from writing to an RFID tag if this "access key code" byte doesnt match. Its really more of an accident prevention mechanisim (so you dont accidentally overwrite an ExxonSpeedPass if it was put in a WalMart system).
Encryption of the "Writable" tags is the responsibility of the application. Since you only have 20 bytes (on the more common, cheaper tags) there isnt much you can do anyway as the number of permutations at 20! is low enough for most script-kiddies to crack. When you start getting upto 256 bytes, then sure it makes absolute sense to encrypt the contents. But, when you're at that price level, you're already considering the hardware that can encrypt at the signal level.
(Yes, I write code dealing with RFID tags)
-Mike
not so much of a fud but "heads up" (Score:3, Insightful)
TFA mentions a couple of these examples, where deployment is flawed. The flaw is not in the RFID technology.
As fo
Uhhhh... (Score:3, Funny)
Hello noobcakes (Score:2)
Which is pretty scary if it's YOUR SpeedPass they're using.
Noob.
Re:Hello noobcakes (Score:2)
Re:Hello noobcakes (Score:3, Insightful)
As in so many things on slashdot, the definition of "free" matters here. In this case, it could mean
1) no one was charged for the fuel by ExxonMobil.
or
2) some other ExxonMobil customer was charged for the fuel, but the pumper was not charged.
or
3) the fuel was liberated.
It seems to me that #2 is by far the most likely, which is probably what the GP poster was getting at.
As fo
Re:Hello noobcakes (Score:2)
I have a Speedpass and from what I've understood from the contract agreement they supply with the device is any unauthorized charges should be handled in the same manner as an unauthorized charge to the credit card that the Speedpass is linked to. Meaning, call your CC company and dispute the charge with the added step of calling Speedpass and disabling the device. I've never actually had to do
Re:Uhhhh... (Score:2)
Well if you are morly challenged, then I would say nothing is wrong with it. Stealing from anyone, is, well, stealing, no matter how big a boogie-man you make the large "heartless corperations" out to be.
Hacking? (Score:2, Insightful)
The examples given all appeared to be illegal to me.
Well (Score:4, Informative)
Credit card theft and misuse could be almost eliminated with better cards that use encryption so the code changes every time they are used. No longer would the number of your visa card suffice, every transaction would need a new code. For a business relationship, you would press a button on the card to generate a code that a particular merchant could then use repeatedly to charge the card from, and only that merchant.
Of course, every security measure can be broken. Thieves could still swipe actual cards (and they could be cancelled just as quickly like it is today, but no thief could use the card without phyisically possessing it). With electron microscopes and specialized equipment someone could read the codes out of memory for a card, and create duplicates : but the cost and time involved could easily be so onerous that no criminal ever did it.
I think the slashdot mentality is one of fear of the tech because if the megacorps deploying these cards screw it up, we could end up with a system far less secure than we have now. For instance, wireless internet could have been made pretty much 100% secure from the start, but instead was pathetically easy to hack and far less secure than standard cat-5 jacks with no log on.
I imagine a future walmart or best buy where you grab anything you want to buy and throw it in a mostly plastic shopping cart. You wheel it through a special detector booth enclosed on three sides, and with one big electronic beep EVERYTHING gets instantly scanned, and a total price comes. You take your credit card out of its protective foil sheath, push a physical button ON the card (or press your thumbprint to it), and put it into a little recess on the self checkout machine. You close the foil lined door, another beep follows, you open the door and the transaction is done. 15 seconds, start to finish, whether you are buying 1 item or an entire cart full. No more lines at stores that use the technology, ever. Instead of 30 clerks on the job at Walmart, there are just 4 or so "customer service representatives" to handle problems that come up. There's a roll of bags if you want to bag your own stuff, but otherwise you just push the cart right on out of the store. The guards even at best buy never bother to inspect your cart because each expensive or routinely stolen item has a deeply embedded rfid tag with a writable (WRITE ONCE) field that "knows" if it has been bought. Everything in your cart gets interrogated when you push it through the doors.
No need for a paper receipt, either - a customer id for who bought the item is on the tag for each item. When you return stuff, you don't need a receipt, either, the clerk can quickly scan all your items when returned and press one button to instantly refund your money or give you store credit with your store card.
Course, this is the real world. We can't get fcking word processing to work without any trouble at all on computers in offices because viruses, bloatware, stupid users, features creep, and constant other problems mean that the commonly used Word is MORE trouble prone that windows and DOS word perfect I used back in 1990. That's like a modern car being out performed by a model T! I can imagine this RFID stuff not working right either, or a health scare starting up due to the magneti
Re:Well (Score:2)
Even in the ideal example you provide, I STILL need to SEE the receipt to make sure I was charged the right amount for each item. This doesn't guarantee that the system is up-to-date with prices, coupons, rebates, sales, etc. One big beep, and I can get screwed even with all the security measures in place and working p
Re:Well (Score:2)
Course, you can see where this is going. A good implementation, using high quality electronics and software...with the level of
Re:Well (Score:2)
Re:Well (Score:2)
Hobbiest hacking of RFID (Score:4, Interesting)
Kick Me (Score:3, Funny)
factual error in TFA about SHA-1 (Score:5, Informative)
This is incorrect.
SHA-1 is a digest algorithm. You give it some data, it outputs a 160-bit string that represents a fingerprint of the data. This fingerprint does not allow you to reconstruct the original input, but you can use it to verify data integrity, that data have not been tempered with. This does not protect against eavesdropping. Hacking a digest algorithm means to find, in a reasonable amount of time, two different inputs that produce the same digest.
SHA-1 is not a cipher. A cipher takes plain-text and a cipher-key in, and produces cipher-text out, which would appear to a third person without a cipher-key as a pretty random string.
Re:factual error in TFA about SHA-1 (Score:2)
Re:factual error in TFA about SHA-1 (Score:2)
The SHA series of digest algorithms are PART of the Secure Sockets Layer cryptographic protocols, which are far and away the most popular way to secure "https://" web sites that collect credit card information.
June Consumer Reports on RFID (Score:3, Interesting)
What was interesting to me in the same articla is a reference to IBM having a 2001 patent application for tracking individual persons using the RFID constellation they create when carrying around a significant number of RFID tags. You nominate your target and profile what RFIDs they have, and then just look for that specific profile as it floats from detector to detector. This is scary stuff.
On a slightly related note, I remember seeing a comment somewhere about how teenage boys could profile the RFID constellation of hot looking women walking down the street and correlate this with the Victorias Secret catalogue in order to pick who was wearing the hot lingerie. This is a weird but possible new behaviour that RFIDs is opening.
Of more importance, I saw recently a reference to an RFID tag that could be embedded in currency notes as an anti counterfitting measure. Imagine how the muggers would jump on board this if it comes true.
Re:June Consumer Reports on RFID (Score:2)
You would attach an RFID tag to each item, then set up a few readers to triangulate the position. If all the equipment becomes cheap enough (it will) you could set up readers around the house/appartment, then just look at your computer to see where your keys are on the map of your appartment.
You just made me think of a useful application of position tracking with RFID
Most CARS have secret RFIDs to allow US gov spy ! (Score:2, Informative)
Spy transmission chips embedded in tires that can be read REMOTELY while driving.
A secret initiative exists to track all funnel-points on interstates and US borders for car tire ID transponders (RFID chips embedded in the tire).
Yup. My brother works on them (since 2001).
The us gov T.R.E.A.D. act (which passed) made it illegal to sell new passenger
I for one... (Score:2)
Seriously though - I hope organizations which are implementing this are seriously considering the security risks and implications. Though I fear the people trying to sell them this technology are emphasing the cost-savings and largely ignoring the potential for abuse.
RFID used for the wrong thing (Score:3, Insightful)
Most of the good RFID-enabled security measures I've seen essentially use the RFID as a rapid user ID. When I approach a secured door, the RFID says "this is Proteus", and a second device (PIN-pad, hand scanner, etc.) says "ok, prove it". That's much the same as a username/password pair, except cloning the RFID has a higher work-factor than guessing a user ID (e.g. it requires physical proximity and specialized hardware).
That doesn't mean RFID isn't secure. It's just that too many people are using it as magical techno-faery-dust to solve security problems, and that behavior leads to insecurity.
Of course, there are real security issues with certain RFID applications. The DoS that can result from removing/altering the tags is concerning -- makes one wonder why the RFID tag in a library book (for example) needs more data than an unalterable serial number. Can't the readers correlate that number with record in a DB?
Add to that the issue of tracking that comes with things like implantable RFID chips. Yeah, those could just be a serial number. But imagine stores putting RFID scanners in their doorways: they know the ID# of everyone who went in and out of the store, and even if they can't correlate that with your identity, the police could. Now, what if I clone your ID# and rob a store?
Again, though, that's not a problem with the RFID tech, but with an ill-concieved implementation and too much trust. The only security problem with the tech itself is the overwriting/erasing issue.
New Hampshire Resists Real-ID (Score:4, Informative)
In addition, there was a large rally at the NH State Capitol; here is that video [google.com].
Unfortunately, our State Senate pulled some extremely underhanded parlimentary tricks to kill HB1582; all the gory details (and sound bites from the Senate) are here [freestateblogs.net]. The good news is, we here in the "Live Free or Die" still actively resisting this intrusion into our privacy!
Cookies? (Score:3, Insightful)
This makes no sense. Either he has to get access to the library/E-ZPass data (in which case no cookie is needed) or the library needs to be writing to the tag - which it doesn't do.
Can anyone invert the ignorant-reporter-transform which has been applied to this paragraph?
Re:Over the edge (Score:3, Informative)
I don't know where you get this idea, but currently most public libraries make it a point to destroy the record of you checking out a book after you return it, just so that they don't have this information available if/when the government comes around ask
Re:Over the edge (Score:2)
Actually, many libraries are no longer keeping this information specifically so that they can never be forced to give it to the government.
I recently found about $30 in a book - the library had no way of telling me who the last person to check the boo
Re:Very interesting (Score:2)
I love government. Especially mine (Virginia).