Open Voting at OSCON 135
fmclain writes "The Open Voting Consortium (OVC) which has already been mentioned
here
will be demonstrating its
open source voting system,
which includes a voter verifiable paper trail, at this year's OSCON in Portland. The
Mercury News
(free reg.) describes this as the touch-screen holy grail. Given Diebold's
troubles
in California this can't come too soon. The OVC
has already demonstrated a working system in Sacramento."
The Same News We Have Already Heard (Score:5, Insightful)
Of course, that is exactly what I said here [slashdot.org] as well. But that didn't fly to well with the slashdotters then either.
Voter registration fraud (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Voter registration fraud (Score:1)
Re:Voter registration fraud (Score:2)
Mod this guy up! He gets the issue. Voting is a right of Citizenship. It should not go to non-citizens and or to persons of no account who have violated society and shown their irresponsibility to the health, safety and good will of their community. Such persons lack the right or the judgement to manage our society and should not pick its leaders.
I live in Alabama. My Wife is a Philippine national. She applied for her learners permit took the test and after checking her passport and handing her the le
Re:Who cares (Score:1)
Computers in elections are the same thing. They make the problem much larger should anything happen. Stuff DOES happen.
I don't care if you open source and use military grade security. If its a computer and a party has billions of dollars of power on their side, like we have at stake in every national election
Re:The Same News We Have Already Heard (Score:5, Insightful)
1)Multiple ways of counting the votes (electronic, paper, OCR). One way must be paper.
2)Different groups doing each count
3)All methods MUST be counted
4)All counts must agree within a small percent error, and the percent error must be less than the margin of the election. If they do not, revote.
Re:The Same News We Have Already Heard (Score:2, Redundant)
Re:The Same News We Have Already Heard (Score:1)
Re:The Same News We Have Already Heard (Score:4, Informative)
This used to be done by having representatives from each party there for the vote counting, corroberating the results. In some countries, in addition to party monitors, independent non-partisan groups check the vote count. In the U.S. however, we have been lulled into trusting the vote count and so as far as I know these efforts haven't been organized recently. Now electronic voting machines that don't produce any sort of auditable trail prevent citizens from exercising this level of oversight should they desire to. There are a few groups talking about non-partisan election monitoring this November. I'm aware of VoteWatch [votewatch2004.org], and perhaps the League of Women Voters and the ACLU will organize monitoring in particularly vulnerable districts. Is anyone aware of other efforts?
Oh, yes, I will repeat myself over and over... (Score:5, Informative)
I live in Brasil. We have had voting machines in the last 12-14 years (yes, twelve to fourteen -- it depends the size of the city you are in). Brazilians here: the first election here in Belo Horizonte to use the machines were the mayoral (and city council, state representation, governor, house and senate) before FHC was elected (as I count it, 2 years + 8 years + 1 1/2 = 11,5 years). I know it, because I was "mesário" (election "table" official? election "clerk"? what is a good English translation?) in the previous election, and in the two subsequent elections). IIRC, there were electronic ballot boxes in Rio and Sao Paulo in the election before that (the only two cities larger than Belo Horizonte).
Our voting machines are mainly of three different (internally) models: (a) the old ones, that use VirtuOS (*) as the OS, (b) the new ones, that use WinCE as the OS, and (c) the newest and deprecated ones that have the second printer to print your vote, show it to you inside a clear acrilic case, and mix it with others inside the machine.
Externally, all of them look roughly the same: a box similar to the old "portable computers" of the eighties, with a 5-6" diagonal LCD and a big numerical keypad in the right side of the screen, that has, besides the 0-9 keys, "confirma" (ok), "erro" (cancel), and "branco" (white).
The electoral process (from the point of view of the voter) begins
In the election day, you scan the newspapers (or the Superior Electoral Court website), search for the address of your section, and go there. No, there is no transit vote, you can only vote at that address. If you can't get there, you'll have to "justify" your absence.
At the section, you will present your voter id to one the "mesários", and if you don't have it on you, you can still vote (you can show other valid id), but will be delayed. The mesário will search for your name in the vote-ticket sheet, and annex it to your id while you vote. You will sign a receipt in a sheet, and proceed to the voting "booth". Another "mesário" will type your voter id # in a remotely connected keypad, setting the machine in the "ready to vote" mode.
The voting "booth" is really only a desk with the voting machine over it, facing nobody else in the room, and sometimes with a cardboard "cover" around it. You will "dial" the numbers of the candidates, in order. when you dial all the digits of one candidate, a star-trek-like chime rings, his/her face will show up in the screen, and if you digited it right, you hit "ok". otherwise, you hit "cancel" and start over. After typing all the candidates, you hit "ok" one last time, the machine chimes again, and goes to "stand by" mode. You have voted. If you don't want to vote for nobody, you can hit "white" instead of the candidate ## (accounted as a "white vote", or "none of the above" -- this is the equivalent of putting your paper ballot in the box without marking anything), or if you really want to protest you can type 9999 or other non-existent-candidate-#, and your vote will be accounted as a "null vote", or "I'm really pissed of" (the equivalent of drawing pictures or writing "improper expletives" in a paper ballot)
Then, you get your id back, your ticket (keep it together with your voter id!!), and you go home. Ah, bars do not open (theoretically) in the election day, so hope you have bought your beer in the day before).
From the point of view of election officials, things are more complicated. The machines
Good Summary (Score:2)
Good summary. I like it so much, I've posted it to my blog [karljones.com].
-kgj
getting there... (Score:1)
The new features......
Whew... (Score:3, Funny)
For a second there I thought it said Open Voting at SCO.
Paper trail (Score:5, Informative)
This is all implemented on a state level. Call your local representatives NOW. This is something you personally can get involved in. Chances are, particularly if you live in a backwater state like I do, that your state senators have never heard of open source. It's your responsibility to educate them.
If you wanna make sure your vote doesn't get hacked, get involved!
Re:Paper trail (Score:3, Interesting)
Maybe we should have computers count paper instead of first counting votes and then generating paper.
A real improvement in accountability would be a computer system that audited the *humans* who audit the *process*.
Re:Paper trail (Score:1)
Re:Paper trail (Score:1)
Re:Paper trail (Score:1)
Re:Paper trail (Score:2)
If a recount is triggered and a difference is found between the two records, which record do you take
Re:Paper trail (Maine Legislature ROCKS) (Score:5, Informative)
Oh yeh-- there's an amendment. To see it, click on the "Amendments" link on the "Bill Text and Other Docs" page, or click here [state.me.us].
This is a sweet little piece of legislation. My favorite parts: it prohibits networking the voting machines, requires the voting machine software to be open source, and requires the voting machines to print paper ballots that are inspected by the voter and then placed into a ballot box. I am deeply impressed with this, and with the sponsor, Maine State Representative Hannah Pingree.
Here's a question: does anybody other than the OVC have a product that meets the criteria specified in the Act?
Responding to the parent post, I'll say that Maine can be considered a "backwater state," and its legislature has produced what appears to me to be a kick-ass piece of legislation on e-voting that explicitly requires open source software. Do big, rich, important states like California have such good legislation? I think not [slashdot.org]. Score one for the backwater states!
--Mark
PS: if you're near a Ben & Jerry's scoop shop, go there next Tuesday, April 27, and take advantage of Free Cone Day!!!
Re:Paper trail (Maine Legislature ROCKS) (Score:2)
Re:Paper trail (Maine Legislature ROCKS) (Score:2)
I just have to ask, what's the point? At what point are we deploying computers just for the sake of deploying more computers? How do these votes get counted? The same old-fashioned way?
Computers are good at counting, and even storing massive records of votes. This is something they are good at, and in trying to avoid the system getting corrupted, we've now removed from the proposal anything and everything for which the computer is needed/wanted, and we're left with nothing but a glorified voting card.
Re:Paper trail (Maine Legislature ROCKS) (Score:2)
Separate scanning machines could be used to read the paper ballots and count the votes, and I wouldn't have a problem with it, as long as the paper ballots are available for recoun
Who Gets the Profit? (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Who Gets the Profit? (Score:4, Insightful)
1) states/regions that have already spent millions on Diebold machines,
2) states/regions that don't have the budget to overhaul the paper voting systems already in place.
The groups seeking electronic 'improvement' have, for the most part, already tanked their money into Diebold systmes, so you'll be hard-pressed to find a city council / state legislature in those respective areas that will willingly devote more of their budgets to MORE electronic voting machines. Constituents in these communities won't stand for that kind of spending because the information about the faulty machines has been kept too well under wraps to raise popular concern.
Ultimately, however, if these machines can get into even one voting district in this nation in the place of Diebold, then I'll count it a success. However, I doubt the machine producers will feel that giddily about such a small profit margin.
Re:Who Gets the Profit? (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Who Gets the Profit? (Score:2)
In Britain we have the Sale of Goods Act where, if the products weren't of merchantable quality when they're sold, you get to get your money back. Now as it's been proved that Diebold provided uncertified machines and a number of failures have occurred why can't Californian election officials just return the machines and ask for their cash back? Then they'd have plenty of money to implement the OSV systems. Even if they d
I'm all about some technology (Score:4, Funny)
Re:I'm all about some technology (Score:1)
Re:I'm all about some technology (Score:1)
Re:I'm all about some technology (Score:2)
Whoop de do (Score:2)
Re:Whoop de do (Score:1)
You can't hook up a wire to a box and change the paper trail either, that's the point.
Re:Whoop de do (Score:5, Insightful)
So India's 100% electronic general election, underway as I type this, is just a figment of South Asia's collective imagination? How much more "mainstream" than the entire electorate of a democracy three times as populous as the US can e-voting get?
Re:Whoop de do (Score:2)
Ok, why aren't we using India's system?
Re:Whoop de do (Score:1)
(The info about India is down towards the bottom of the story summary).
Re:Whoop de do (Score:1)
Paper votes aren't always secure either (Score:5, Insightful)
True, you can't change paper votes by wire, but there are lots of traditional methods for interfering with paper votes:
A fair and free vote requires confidence in the mechanism, but also in the count, and the officials, and the register, and lots of other parts of the process.
In some countries, hacking electronic machines might be one of the harder ways to steal an election :-(
And if they switch ballot boxes.... (Score:2)
Re:Paper votes aren't always secure either (Score:3, Insightful)
Its interesting that you mention this. A year ago I was working with groups trying to ensure the integrity of [non-electronic] voting in Nigeria. My boss, who was also working on the project, mentioned that in his conversations with Nigerians many expressed greater confidence in a computerized election.
The argument could be made that this is due to naivite and blind faith in computers... indeed it's telli
there is no ONE TRUE METHOD (Score:4, Informative)
All electoral methods (indeed most forms of government) represent a tradeoff between different considerations.
For voting methods, criteria of "goodness" might include this list [wot I mostly nicked]:
See this interesting Wikipedia article [wikipedia.org] for further discussion of these ideas...
Re:Condorcet's Method (Score:2, Informative)
Condorcets Method [eskimo.com]
But I am not sure you are sufficiently informed on the nature of our great United States we are a Democratic REPUBLIC and the although I agree Condorcet's method may remove some of the "You wouldn't want to throw your vote away" syndrom that influences so many voters there is still the electoral college and even worse, as the last election demonstrated, it just doesn't matter.
I agree with you on one point: How we count our votes does not equate to vot
Questions... (Score:2)
I'm all for open source... love it.
And I don't trust Diebold anymore than the next guy.
But is open source really appropriate for this situation? Especially for a voting system that works on "very inexpensive PC hardware".
Wouldn't it be very easy for someone to patch the software in a bad way and recompile it before installation?
I assume this has been thought of already, but I can't figure out how to prevent that kind of danger.
Re:Questions... (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Questions... (Score:2)
Re:Questions... (Score:2)
Can the second machine cross-reference the bar code AND the text? Maybe only random intervals would be enough to insure nothing funny going on.
I am thinking about righting my Secretary of State about this.
Re:Questions... (Score:4, Funny)
>the software in a bad way and recompile it
>before installation?
yeah, because of course no one's worked out a way to tell that a binary is the one you think it is <cough>checksum<cough>, since this whole open source thing is so new that no one's ever installed it in a security critical place before <cough>nsa<cough>.
you're right, we should run out and install windows right away, since we can trust billg to tell us that our systems are safe.
Re:Questions... (Score:2)
I was asking a question not making a statement. Please forgive me for offending your sense of obviousness.
SMARTYPANTS... Splplpplpl!
Re:Questions... (Score:1)
1. Of course there's no guarantee that "many eyes" will detect a given security flaw. But it's statistically more likely than "few eyes" finding it.
2. A paper trail is one of the key features of the open source system in question (from OVC). In fact it's more than a "trail", it's the paper vote that counts, not the electro
Re:Questions... (Score:4, Informative)
Wouldn't someone be able to do this with a closed source app as well? Closed source is not the same as no source.
Re:Questions... (Score:3, Interesting)
>but I can't figure out how to prevent
>that kind of danger.
1. design the system to run from a cd ( knoppix ?).
2. have the bios checksum the cd during boot, display te result on the screen
3. the poll-workers verify that the check-sum is correct
4. profit!
Exactly Appropriate (Score:4, Insightful)
When it comes to something as critical to the welfare of the public and to our form of government as the assurance of fair elections, open source software should be encouraged vigorously.
Software does not become more secure by hiding the sourcecode, and election results are not made more secure by entrusting the results to a corporation. These facts, compounded by the rampant infiltration of corporate interests in the US government, and, at the same time, the vast amount of public scrutiny sure to be given an open source voting system like this one, make the choice IMO a no brainer.
This is the perfect market open source (Score:5, Insightful)
sigh... They really don't get it. Unlike Windows XP, or Adobe Photoshop, voting software requires very limited runs, and typically needs to recover its cost on its first sale. There's no need to make revenue on a per copy basis. There is probably only going to be a single customer who will have precise demands. If it was closed source, the amount of work would be the same, and the amount and so that you could charge would be the same.
Companies really need to get over the idea that because code costs money to produce, it must have value. Sometimes it is the case. Often it isn't.
Re:This is the perfect market open source (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:This is the perfect market open source (Score:3, Insightful)
I agree with this point. I'll also point out that the _real_ value that a voting system vendor provides isn't the software system, it's the comp
Re:This is the perfect market open source (Score:1)
Re:This is the perfect market open source (Score:2)
Re:This is the perfect market open source (Score:1)
I was afraid you'd say something like that. :(
I wonder how many counties will be left by 2006 that haven't already been forced to invest in diebold or similar untrustworthy systems.
Re:This is the perfect market open source (Score:2)
Has OVS attempted to get their system certified? (Score:5, Informative)
The Federal Election Commission [fec.gov] has a FAQ About The National Voluntary Voting System Standards [fec.gov]. The FAQ [fec.gov] indicates that to meet the standards, an election system must satisfy either "FEC's voting system standards" or pass tests "by independent testing authorities (ITAs) designated by the National Association of State Election Directors."
The National Association of State Election Directors [nased.org] has, among other things:
(1) a List of NASED Certified Systems [nased.org];
(2) an Updated List of NASED Certified Systems [nased.org]; and, most importantly,
(3) an Overview of the Certification Process [nased.org].
Has the Open Voting Consortium [openvotingconsortium.org] made any attempt to get their software certified?
Re:Has OVS attempted to get their system certified (Score:1)
hack our way to freedom (Score:5, Informative)
Now you can help, in standard "Open Source Community" fashion. Email stories about this OSS voteware, and the serious problems with the proprietary voteware it replaces, to your local newspaper, TV station, and elected representatives. Keep your tone serious, professional, and no-nonsense about your intolerance of votefixing in the status quo. You have about 75 days left in which to be heard - after that, there's no time to do anything but whine. And soon after that, even whining will be out of the picture.
Diebold *BLOCKED* in California (Score:4, Informative)
Article Here [washingtonpost.com]
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3 4424-2004Apr22.html
Pretty much, California's Voting Systems and Procedures Panel decided by a UNANIMOUS vote of 8 - 0 to block counties from using Diebold machines for the November elections.
I'm normally very cynical when it comes to politics, but it's nice to see my state get (somewhat) of a clue.
Re:Diebold *BLOCKED* in California (Score:2, Informative)
Sorry for replying to my own post, but I forgot to quote this nugget from the article:
Re:Diebold *BLOCKED* in California (Score:3, Informative)
"The Voting Systems Panel did not recommend against continued use of the Diebold TS electronic voting machines or use of optical-scan voting machines. The GEMs software is also not affected by this decision."
Or... (Score:3, Insightful)
We do not have time to make the current machines have valid paper trails without sacrificing either security or anonymity, since their printers suck.
Re:Or... (Score:2)
Um..... (Score:2, Interesting)
Re:Um..... (Score:2)
Re:Um..... (Score:3, Informative)
Re:Um..... (Score:4, Insightful)
It helps to read the article. Go ahead and read it now; I'll wait here.
The computer records the voter's choices, and then prints out a paper ballot, which includes a bar code. If you are not blind, you inspect the ballot with your eyes. If you are blind, you can take the ballot to a bar code reader, and put on headphones, scan the barcode, and listen as it reads back your votes to you.
The vote can't be traced back to the person, because the person verfies the ballot at the polling place, and then deposits the ballot in the ballot box. Since the voter doesn't write his or her name on the ballot, or any other identifying information, it's exactly the same as current paper-based systems of voting.
Note that if you try to steal the election by tricky programming in the poll computer, the inspection of the ballots reveals your plot. If you try tricky programming of the official ballot-counting computers, you can be found out in a recount with different computers.
This system is way better than a black-box "just trust us" e-voting computer.
steveha
Re:Um..... (Score:2)
Re:Um..... (Score:3, Informative)
1) It's way easier to verify than punch cards. Just read it.
2) No hanging chads. Inspecting a ballot does not alter the ballot.
3) No hanging chad jokes.
steveha
Re:Um..... (Score:2)
1) As oposed to looking to see that you indeed put a hole in the right spot
2) Would be solved if people actualy did 0 and 1
3) There will always be hanging chad jokes.
Re:Um..... (Score:2)
Perhaps you have used a different punch card voting system than the one I used. The one I used you need to concentrate carefully to make sure you are punching in the right place.
1) As oposed to looking to see that you indeed put a hole in the right spot
Now you are just trolling. Which is easier, verifying that a small hole was punched on number 36 and not on number 37, or reading the names you voted for printed on a sheet? It's a lot easier to just
Re:Um..... (Score:2)
Re:Um..... (Score:2)
Paper ballots are about as secure as voting gets. You need to be able to do a re-count. You need to make it harder to steal an election, so it's good that a bag full of ballots is a big thing that is hard to hide (as opposed to votes stored on a hard disk in a black-box voting machine). You need to be able to check the system, so it's good that you can feed the same ballots into different counting machines to make sure the count is the same, and it's also good tha
Modest proposal: Run it on Diebold's hardware? (Score:5, Interesting)
But Diebods's system appears to be based on a hardware/OS platform that, at its core, is Wintel. No doubt the same is true for many, perhaps even all, of the others. (Even if they're not, Linux and the GNU toolset already has ports to many other processors/platforms, including essentially all commonly available current-generation processors.)
Perhaps it might be possible to port the Open Source voting software to the Diebold and/or other voting machines that have already been purchased?
The bulk of the machines you need are the ones in the booths. Plug an off-the-shelf printer into a Diebold and you're all set there. (No security issues on the printer itself, beyond making sure it's working.)
For the remainder, you only need one (plus maybe a spare) with a working OCR reader, sound card, and modem - for the blind readback and the uplink scan. Put that scanner on the exiting voting machine with the modem (as Diebold does on one of the machines for doing the final uplink to the state's database). Or put it on a cheap desktop, since the touchscreen is not necessary.
(Heck: Put the software for THAT machine on a bootable CD-ROM and you don't even need a special machine. Just borrow one from the school library for election day. Even if some BIOS-based malware managed to get activated and save the data, there's no confidentiality issues with what is on that machine. Any corruption of the data by malware would be detected in a manual recount, just like corruption in any other part of the total system.)
For future instalations you could go with generic touchscreen systems - or stick with the major vendors if their prices come down into the sanity range or if you want to pay a premium for ironclad hardware (like byers of "True Blue" PCs from IBM). The voting machine vendors could even make money as vendors of ruggedized commodity hardware if they don't have to maintain all that proprietary voting software.
Re:Modest proposal: Run it on Diebold's hardware? (Score:1)
Re:Modest proposal: Run it on Diebold's hardware? (Score:2)
But do they have a serial or parallel port, or any kind of expansion connector for a printer? Even internally?
I had heard that they do have provision for adding one of their own printers. If the interface for that is standard one might come up with a cheap adapter to bring out a cable for an off-the-shelf printer, suitable for use with your software. (Unlike the machine it
Re:Modest proposal: Run it on Diebold's hardware? (Score:2)
Supposedly they all have a printer inside them. This is because the HAVA law reuires that they print out a record of the votes. Strangely, they decided that it was sufficient to print a total when the polls close, and not a continuous record of votes cast, so there's no way to prove that the total printed is correct, and thus no value in printing it.
Just found Cringely's article on that, too. (Score:2)
Supposedly they all have a printer inside them. This is because the HAVA law reuires that they print out a record of the votes. Strangely, they decided that it was sufficient to print a total when the polls close, and not a continuous record of votes cast, so there's no way to prove that the total printed is correct, and thus no value in printing it.
I just found Cringely's March 11 Column which also says that, and suggests rep
Re:Just found Cringely's article on that, too. (Score:2)
This is a good "stop gap" measure so that counties that already bought DRE's could improve them a bit, though I think that when you get into the details it's not what you would really want to use to vote on.
For example, since the record
Re:Just found Cringely's article on that, too. (Score:2)
Sure they can. (Remember: The tape is not staying in the machine. The voter is taking it to the ballot box.)
Here's one way:
- The voter registers his choice and says "print it".
- The printer spits out the choices on the tape - but doesn't spit the final part.
- The
Re:Modest proposal: Run it on Diebold's hardware? (Score:1)
Geek Voters (Score:3, Funny)
Smart cards! (Score:1)
Re:Smart cards! (Score:2, Insightful)
Any kind of voter-verifiable trail needs to be simple enough that the ordinary person can understand and trust it.
Barcodes, encryption, etc all fail this test, no matter how untamperable they might be. If you want the paper trail to be machine readable, you want a list of names in plain text with a big black machine-readable DOT next to the name they voted for.
A human-readable paper vote, placed into a locked box, and counted under the scrutiny of multiple volunteers is the only system of vot
Paper Audiot? Even Better... (Score:1, Insightful)
Re:Paper Audiot? Even Better... (Score:2)
To sum up the history of the U.S. Census Bureau, they took almost 12 years to complete the 1880 Census, the last U.S. Census done entirely by hand. The census of the USA is required by the constitution to be completed every 10 years, so they (the Census Bureau) kn
Liberty Day (Score:2, Insightful)
Granted, I probably won't vote for the president, but I may vote in my local congressional and state/local races, if I can get home from work in time.
Then again, what this country needs is a TON more holidays
Re:Liberty Day (Score:2)
This is neat and all, but IMHO what this country really needs is a new holiday, the first tuesday in November, so nobody has any excuse not to show up and vote.
And if election day is November 8th, by your system we're screwed.
Just to be pedantic, election day is the First Tuesday after the First Monday in November. ;)
Is anyone else as freaked out about this as I? (Score:5, Insightful)
I think it's almost ABSURD that a closed-source partisan company is building the ballot boxes. Even if there is no malicious intent, the system is totally open to malicious intent in the future.
This is not a technical issue, it's an idealogical one.
LS
Open Voting at OSCON? (Score:1)
Python strikes again. (Score:1)
Re:Thank you. (Score:2, Insightful)
I hope you intend to open source version 1 as well.
Re:The CA problem was garbage in - garbage out (Score:2, Informative)
The software itself didn't work.
Diabold has now admitted it didn't work and apologized for it.
California should sue Diabold.
Cruz Bustemente should sue California and the governator should be recalled.